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Abstract
During human evolution, individuals interacted mostly within small groups that
were connected by limited migration and sometimes by conicts. Which preferences,
if any, will prevail in such scenarios? Building on population biology models of spa-
tially structured populations, and assuming individualspreferences to be their private
information, we characterize those preferences that, once established, cannot be dis-
placed by alternative preferences. We represent such uninvadable preferences in terms
of tness and in terms of material payo¤s. At the tness level, individuals can be re-
garded to act as if driven by a mix of self-interest and a Kantian motive that evaluates
own behavior in the light of the consequences for own tness if others adopted this
behavior. This Kantian motive is borne out from (genetic or cultural) kin selection.
At the material-payo¤ level, individuals act as if driven in part by self-interest and
a Kantian motive (in terms of material payo¤s), but also in part by other-regarding
preferences towards other group members. This latter motive is borne out of group re-
source constraints and the risk of conict with other groups. We show how group size,
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the migration rate, the risk of group conicts, and cultural loyalty shape the relative
strengths of these motives.
Keywords: strategic interactions, preference evolution, evolution by natural selec-
tion, cultural transmission, pro- and anti-sociality, Kantian moral concerns
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1 Introduction
Preferences are fundamental to economic theory.1 If preferences are transmitted across
generations and if they a¤ect the expected survival and reproduction the tness of their
bearer: which preferences are likely to be favored by evolution and which preferences are
likely to disappear? Analysis of the long-term evolution of preference distributions can help
understand the proximate drivers and motivation of human behavior in social and economic
interactions (Hirshleifer, 1977, Bergstrom, 1996, Binmore 1998, Robson, 2001, Newton, 2018,
Alger andWeibull, 2019). Here we build on previous work on strategy evolution in structured
populations (Lehmann, Alger, and Weibull, 2015) by studying preference evolution in such
populations.
For more than a million years, our ancestors most likely lived in groups of hunter-gatherers
(probably ranging from 5 to 150 grown-ups), extending beyond the nuclear family (Grueter,
Chapais, and Zinner, 2012, Malone, Fuentes, and White, 2012, van Schaik, 2016, Layton,
OHara, and Bilsborough, 2012). This population structure, whose dening features are
small group size and limited migration between groups (i.e., not all individuals migrate),
is thus part of the environment of evolutionary adaptation of the human lineage (e.g., van
Schaik, 2016). Analysis of the long-term evolution of preferences should thus take such pop-
ulation structure into account. We here do exactly that, and we ask how such structural
features as group size, migration rates between groups, and the risk of conicts between
groups, determine the qualitative nature of the preferences that evolution favors. Combin-
ing the economics paradigm of utility-maximizing behavior with methods from population
genetics, we obtain predictions about the nature of individualspreferences and motivations
in the canonical model of evolution in structured populations, the so-called island model
of migration originally due to Wright (1931, 1943). The model allows us to examine both
1Throughout this paper we use concepts and terminology that are standard in economics, and model
behavior as a choice of action (or stream of actions) from a set of feasible actions, where this choice is guided
by a striving to maximize some goal (utility) function. The utility function together with the information
and the constraints imposed by the environment are thus what biologists would call the proximate causes
driving behavior. Furthermore, by contrast to the evolutionary biology literature where the terms altruism
and spiteare used to refer to the tness consequences of a behavior on the actor and others, in economics
they are used to describe the proximate causes behind behaviors. Thus, in economics, an individual who
has a utility function which puts a positive weight on another individuals material well-being is altruistic;
and an individual who has a utility function which puts a negative weight on another individuals material
well-being is spiteful. For further discussion of the meaning of these terms in di¤erent academic disciplines,
we refer to West, Gri¢ n, and Gardner (2007) and Bshary and Bergmüller (2008).
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genetic and cultural transmission of preferences in such structured populations.
The island model is a textbook evolutionary biology model (see, e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and
Bodmer, 1971, Frank 1998, Rousset 2004, Hartl and Clark, 2007), which formally captures
in a tractable and stylized way the fact that all natural populations, human or otherwise, are
structured into small groups (or bands, or villages; patches for plants) connected to each other
by limited migration (or dispersal). Limited migration causes limited genetic and/or cultural
mixing in the population, and this results in several individuals from the same group possibly
having a recent common ancestor. For example, suppose that a genetically transmitted new
trait suddenly appears in one individual. In the next generation, multiple carriers of the
new trait may coexist in the same group. Hence, the immediate descendants of the initial
mutant are more likely to interact with each other than are individuals sampled at random
from the whole population. Such assortative matching, induced by limited migration, even
when the mutant trait is rare in the population at large, tends to favor mutant behaviors
that promote the survival and/or reproductive success of others in their group. The reason
is that such behavior is more likely to benet other mutants than it would be if all o¤spring
always migrated and matching therefore would be uniformly random (Hamilton, 1964, 1971,
Grafen, 1985, Frank, 1998, Rousset 2004). This is the so-called mechanism of kin selection in
evolutionary biology (Maynard Smith, 1964).2 In the biology literature, assortative matching
between pairs of individuals is usually quantied by the coe¢ cient of relatednesswhich
indicates the likelihood that interacting individuals share a common ancestora quantity
that depends on such features of the population structure as group size and migration rates.
By the same token, however, individuals who share a local common ancestor are also more
likely to expose each other to tness externalities, than are randomly selected individuals
from the overall population. Indeed, through the local interactions, which occur in islands
of nite size, related individuals may harm or enhance each others tnesses (think of young
siblings ghting over candy, or individuals teaming up to ght o¤ a common enemy), and
such externalities have an impact on selected traits (Hamilton, 1971, Scha¤er, 1988, Frank,
1998, Rousset 2004). As assortative matching and local tness externalities can, in general,
not be separated, their joint e¤ects need to be taken into account in order to understand the
evolutionary success of traits under limited dispersal, a question that has received much at-
tention in the evolutionary biology literature (see e.g. Hamilton, 1967, and Taylor, 1992,a,b,
for pioneering and paradigmatic examples, and Frank, 1998, and Rousset, 2004, for general
theoretical treatments).
While clearly relevant for the understanding the evolution of traits relevant in human
social interactions, the evolutionary biology literature is yet of limited direct value for econo-
mists, because in the bulk of these analyses: (a) the focus is on the evolution of strategies,
not preferences, (b) predictions are derived at the level of basic tness components, such as
reproduction and survival, and not at the level of the material payo¤s obtained in strategic
2A necessary and su¢ cient condition for kin selection to take place is that an evolving genetic (or cultural)
trait tends to more strongly a¤ect the survival and/or reproduction of individuals who are genetically (or
culturally) related to the actor than under uniform random matching (Michod, 1982, p.20). This is true
whether or not relatives recognize each other. Our analysis will be based on the assumption that they cannot
recognize each other.
3
interactions, (c) transmission is genetic instead of cultural, while cultural evolution is also
relevant for the understanding of human behavior. Our model enriches the analysis in all of
these dimensions.
We propose a framework in line with that of economists and game theorists, and model
the following thought experiment that takes place in a large population over an innite
sequence of demographic time periods. The population is structured into a large number
of groups or islands of equal size. Within each group or island, individuals engage in a
strategic interaction in which all individualsstrategy choices may a¤ect the material payo¤s
to all participants. The strategic interaction is modelled as a game in material payo¤s,
and the game may be arbitrarily complex and may take place over many stages within each
demographic time period. By material payo¤we mean a one-dimensional summary measure,
like income (or calories). The expected material payo¤s, realized in a demographic time
period, in turn determine the tness of each individual in the population in that demographic
time period. An individuals tness is dened as the expected number of individuals in the
following time period who have acquired their trait from him (or her). If transmission is
genetic, an individuals tness is the number of his surviving o¤spring and the individual
himself if he survives. If transmission is cultural, an individuals tness is the number of
individuals in the next time period who acquired their cultural trait from this individual.
O¤spring may migrate to other groups or islands, or stay in their natal group or island.
Many di¤erent transmission scenarios are covered by this model framework. For instance,
generations may or may not be overlapping, islands may wage wars against each other, traits
may be transmitted culturally from parent to child or by imitation of materially successful
individuals, etc.
In all our scenarios, genetic and cultural, the population is initially homogenous; all
individuals are ex ante identical. Suddenly, a di¤erent, mutant heritable trait spontaneously
appears in exactly one individual. The original, resident trait is uninvadable if there exists
no mutant trait, such that the initial mutant produces enough descendants for its trait to
be maintained in the population in the long run.
To study preference evolution, we let the heritable traits be continuous utility functions,
dened over all strategy proles that are possible in the material game that represent the
interaction on each island. Together with the individuals (probabilistic) belief about other
group members strategy choices, an individuals utility function guides his or her choice
of strategy in the local interaction. We evaluate a utility functions tness consequences
for its carriers in terms of the expected material payo¤s that result in all (Bayesian) Nash
equilibria under incomplete information, that is, when each individuals utility function is
his or her private information, but individuals beliefs about each others strategies are
consistent with some (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. We ask if there exist utility functions
that are uninvadable in the sense that any mutant utility function does worse, in terms of its
carriersexpected material payo¤s, than the residents, in all equilibria. Thus bridging the
gap between economics and biology, we obtain links between preferences, material incentives,
and population structure (including migration and potential group conicts). The following
four main results emerge from our analysis.
First, we obtain a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a utility function to be unin-
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vadable. This characterization says that a utility function is uninvadable if and only if all
strategies used in any Nash equilibrium among individuals with this utility function are,
when viewed as heritable strategies, uninvadable by other strategies.
Second, we identify a class of utility functions that, for any given game in material
payo¤s, contains an uninvadable utility function. Each utility function in this class can be
interpreted as a mix of self-interest and a Kantian concern, both expressed at the tness
level. Specically, the Kantian concern, driven by kin selection, consists in evaluating ones
behavior in the light of what ones own tness would be if others in ones group were to
behave in the same way. This concern vanishes under unlimited migration (that is, when all
o¤spring always migrate) and when groups are very large.
Third, when material payo¤s only have marginal e¤ects on tnesses (a property which
arguably holds for many human interactions), uninvadable preferences generically involve a
mix of self-interest, a Kantian concern, and also a concern for neighbors, all concerns being
expressed at the level of material payo¤s. The weight given to the Kantian motive is then
proportional to the coe¢ cient of relatedness, but it also depends on tness externalities
between neighbors. The weight on other group membersmaterial payo¤s may be negative
(spite) or positive (altruism), and it depends on the coe¢ cient of tness interdependence,
which measures the e¤ect on own tness that an individual obtains relative to his neighbors
by diminishing or enhancing their material payo¤s.
Finally, we provide su¢ cient conditions for the uninvadability of preferences of a par-
ticularly simple form, namely, a convex combination of own material payo¤ and the own
material payo¤ that would arise should all others choose the same behavior. Under these
specic conditions, the weight given to the second, Kantian, component is determined by
the coe¢ cient of scaled relatedness, a coe¢ cient that combines the (standard) coe¢ cient
of relatedness with the coe¢ cient of tness interdependence. This weight allows to deter-
mine whether, on balance, equilibrium behaviors are pro-or anti-social, in the sense that
equilibrium material payo¤s are higher or lower than under selshness. We show that an
increased risk for group conicts make preferences less anti-social, and, at a critical level of
the risk of group conict, preferences are neither anti- nor pro-social, while at higher risk
levels, preferences turn pro-social. Hence, at this intermediate risk of conict, preferences
have only a self-interested and a Kantian component, while at lower (higher) risks, a third
component appears, a component that expresses envy or spite if the risk is low, and empathy
or altruism if the risk is high. We also show that cultural transmission of preferences may
trigger anti-sociality because of local competition for proselytes.
Compared to the existing economics literature on preference evolution in social interac-
tions (see Alger and Weibull, 2019, for a recent survey), our model makes two key innova-
tions.3 First, it explicitly analyzes the e¤ects of population structure and limited dispersal
3In the economics literature it has been shown that the following conditions are su¢ cient (and necessary
except in knife-edge settings) for populations of self-interested individuals to resist invasion by non-self-
interested individuals: (i) the population is very large and homogeneous (no subdivision by sex, age, size,
etc.) and reproduction is clonal, (ii) interacting individuals do not know each others preferences but have
statistically correct beliefs, and (iii) interactions are uniformly random in the population, in the sense that
each encounter is just as likely (see Ok and Vega-Redondo, 2001, Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007).
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upon behavior and preferences. While Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016) investigated the
evolutionary stability of preferences under incomplete information, they did so in an ab-
stract model of assortative matching which did not explicitly account for the demographics
and population dynamics.4 They found that preferences expressing a certain combination
of self-interest and a Kantian concern are evolutionarily stable, and that preferences that
are behaviorally distinct from these are evolutionarily unstable. They also showed how the
weight given to the Kantian concern depends on the assortativity in group formation. While
assortativity in those models is treated as an abstract primitive, it here arises explicitly
and endogenously from the population structure; group size, rates of survival, migration,
and conicts together determine the probability that rare mutants get to interact with each
other i.e., relatedness. The present model thus contributes to this strand of literature by
explicitly modeling the population structure and how it gives rise to assortativity.
Second, it establishes a clear distinction between preferences at the tness level and
preferences at the material payo¤ level. In the existing economics literature on preference
evolution, these are taken to coincide. The model makes it clear that, when preferences
are expressed at the level of material payo¤s, relatedness must go hand in hand with local
tness interdependence, a force which does not appear in Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016).
We here also show how relatedness and tness interdependence can be formally traced back
to group size and limited migration. While we already made this distinction in Lehmann,
Alger, and Weibull (2015), we then did not analyze preference evolution. Instead, we asked
under what conditions, if any, evolving strategies can be interpreted as chosen by rational
individuals endowed with specic utility functions (we examined three candidate utility
functions, two of which are described above). The value added of the present paper is that
we here analyze preference evolution, rather than strategy evolution, in group-structured
populations. In addition, we (a) examine other utility functions than those used to establish
the as ifresults in Lehmann, Alger, and Weibull (2015), (b) obtain new results concerning
tness interdependence and scaled relatedness, and (c) analyze a wider class of evolutionary
scenarios.
Apart from our previous work, the most closely related work is by Akçay and van Cleve
(2012). They investigated the evolutionary stability of preferences parameterized by scalar
traits (in the vein of Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel, 2007a-b). In addition to focusing on
complete rather than incomplete information, their model di¤ers from ours in two broad
respects. First, since they focus only on the e¤ects of traits on reproduction under genetic
transmission, they do not obtain results for preferences over strategy proles or material
4By contrast to the present model, assortativity was there modeled as an abstract function that maps
the distribution of traits in the population to probabilities governing the matching of interacting individuals.
This formalization of assortativity was pioneered in economics by Bergstrom (1995, 2003), who focused on
strategy evolution; see also Bowles and Gintis (1998), as well as Alger and Weibull (2010, 2012) for analyses
of preference evolution under complete information. This formalization of assortativity, which implicitly
assumes marginal e¤ects of traits on tness, goes back to Hamilton (1971); Michod and Hamilton (1980)
discuss how di¤erent formalizations of assortativity are equivalent to each other. It should further be noted
that Rogers (1994) studied the evolution of time preference in an age-structured population; a setting that
allows for kin selection but not kin competition. Finally, alternative models of endogenous assortativity have
been proposed by Nax and Rigos (2016), Newton (2017), and Wu (2017, 2019).
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payo¤s distinct from fecundity. Second, they focus only on necessary rst-order conditions.
These conditions express how many o¤spring an individual is willing to forgo, at the margin,
in order to marginally increase the number of o¤spring of other group members.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and provides a charac-
terization of an uninvadable trait. Section 3 presents the analysis. In Section 4 we illustrate
our results in three canonical evolutionary scenarios, including genetic and cultural evolu-
tion, as well as potential warsbetween groups. Section 5 concludes. Mathematical proofs
are provided in an appendix.
2 Model
This section presents the building blocks of the analysis the population structure and indi-
vidualslife-cycles and denes the evolutionary stability criterion that will be used. It also
describes what is novel compared to the existing literature.
2.1 Population structure
Consider a countably innite population, divided into innitely many identical islands
(groups, locations, or villages), each of constant size n. Evolution takes place perpetually
and stochastically over time, and time is divided into demographic time periods. Individuals
are called children or o¤spring in their rst demographic period, the period in which they
are born, and grown-ups or adults in all other periods of their life. No age distinction is
made between adults. Each demographic time period consists of two phases:
 In Phase 1, the n adults in each island engage in a social or economic interaction with
each other, the same on all islands and at all times. The strategies used determine
each individuals material payo¤ , which we take to be income (expressed, for example,
in money or in calories). An individuals strategy choice in the interaction is assumed
to be determined by her preferences and her beliefs about the strategies used by her
island neighbors. Preferences are inherited in childhood from exactly one adult, the
individuals genetic or cultural parent, and are xed throughout her life.
 In Phase 2, the realized material payo¤s determine each adults survival, and, in
case there are exogenous random shocks to entire groups (e.g., warfare, environmen-
tal catastrophies), the adults entire groups survival. Individual and group survival
probabilities are assumed to be independent of age. The realized material payo¤s also
determine each adults fecundity, which is its number of o¤spring (where o¤spring are
biological if preferences are coded for genetically, and cultural if they are transmitted
by way of a cultural process). Following reproduction, o¤spring, and only o¤spring,
may migrate from their native island to other islands (and this migration takes place
in the period they are born). The migration probability m is the same for all o¤spring
at all times, and is strictly positive. Moreover, migration is blind in the sense that
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any migrant picks a destination in a uniformly random fashion.5 After migration and
competition among the o¤spring for securing a place on an island, there are exactly n
adults in each island (group). O¤spring who did not secure a place on an island die.
Phase 1 and 2 taken together determine an adults individual tness. This is the expected
number of her immediate descendants, dened as those adults in the next demographic time
period who have inherited their preferences from her. These immediate descendants consist
of those of the individuals (genetic or cultural) o¤spring who survived, and thus became
adults in the next demographic time period, as well as the individual herself if she survived
into the next period. We next describe in more detail how the interactions and the ensuing
individual tness are formalized in the subsequent analysis.
2.2 The interaction
2.2.1 The material game
The material game is formalized as a symmetric non-cooperative normal-form n-player game
in which each player has access to the same set of strategies (which may be pure or mixed),
X, a non-empty compact set in some normed vector space. The expected material payo¤6
accruing to any (adult) individual i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng on a given island depends on her own
strategy, xi 2 X, and on the vector x i 2 Xn 1 of strategies used by the others on is island,
her neighbors. The material payo¤ function  : Xn ! R is continuous, and  (xi;x i) is
invariant under permutation of the components of the vector x i 2 Xn 1.7 Such permutation
invariance holds if, for example, strategies are real numbers, and an individuals material
payo¤ depends on her own strategy and either the sum, product, maximum or minimum of
her island neighborsstrategies. The material game may be a simple simultaneous-move game
or a multi-stage game in which individuals interact over many stages within the demographic
time period.
2.2.2 The subjective game
Every (adult) individual in the population has (personal) preferences over strategy proles,
preferences that can be represented by some continuous utility function.8 More precisely,
5Technically, we study the limit of uniform random dispersal among nitely many islands as the number
of islands tend to innity.
6For simplicity, we will henceforth use material payo¤to refer to expected material payo¤.
7More precisely, for any xi 2 X and x i 2 Xn 1, and any bijection h : f2; 3; :::; ng ! f2; 3; :::; ng:

 
xi; xh(2); xh(3); :::; xh(n)

=  (xi;x i).
8Continuity is inessential for much of the analysis. However, it is important for some existence results, and
for our stability analysis since we there invoke Berges maximum theorem. (A form of upper semi-continuity
would be su¢ cient for these results, but such a generalization does not seem to be of primary interest here.)
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every individual i has a complete and transitive preference ordering i over strategy pro-
les (xi;x i) 2 Xn, such that there exists a continuous function ui : Xn ! R satisfying
ui (xi;x i)  ui
 
yi;y i

if and only if (xi;x i) i
 
yi;y i

. Letting F be the set of con-
tinuous functions f : Xn ! R, each individual has preferences that admit representation by
some function u 2   F , where  is the subset of preference types, or simply types. Each in-
dividual of any given type u 2  chooses her strategy so as to maximize the expected value
of her utility function under her probabilistic beliefs about her island neighborsstrategy
choices.
In order to carry out our evolutionary analysis of preferences, we need to evaluate the
tness consequences of preferences, and we will do so when individuals strategy choices
constitute Nash equilibria in the subjective game. (Which is not to say that we assume or
believe that interactions are always in equilibrium. We use Nash equilibrium as a systematic
reference point.)
2.3 Individual tness
An individuals tness may depend on (a) own material payo¤, (b) the material payo¤s to
the individuals island neighbors, and (c) the material payo¤s in the population at large. De-
pendence on own material payo¤ is self-evident. Dependence on neighborsmaterial payo¤s
arises as soon as neighborssurvival and number of o¤spring inuences the competition that
ones own o¤spring meet when competing for succession of deceased adults on the native
island. Own and othersmaterial payo¤s may also a¤ect ones islands success probability
in wars with other islands. Dependence on material payo¤s in other islands has two sources;
migration and potential wars between islands. First, an individuals o¤spring face compe-
tition with o¤spring from other islands, both when competing for succession of deceased
adults on her native island and on other islands. Second ones islands success probability
in wars may depend on those islandsmaterial payo¤s.
The individual (or direct) tness function w : Rn+1! R is assumed to be continuously
di¤erentiable. We write w (i; i; ) for is tness, where i 2 R is own material payo¤,
 i 2 Rn 1, is the vector of her neighborsmaterial payo¤s, and  2 R is the average
material payo¤ in the population at large.9 We also assume that w (i; i; ) is invariant
under permutation of the components of the vector  i. Owing to the assumption of constant
group size, average tness in the population is always equal to 1. The subsequent analysis
further presumes that an individuals tness is strictly increasing in her own material payo¤,
strictly decreasing in the average material payo¤ in the population at large, and that it may
be decreasing or increasing, or non-monotonic in other group membersmaterial payo¤s,
but never increase more from a neighbors increase in material payo¤ than from the same
increase in own material payo¤. Formally:
[M] (i) @w (i; i; ) =@i > 0, (ii) @w (i; i; ) =@j  @w (i; i; ) =@i for all
9Individual tness is thus assumed to be expressible in terms of expected material payo¤ only, and we
therefore neglect e¤ects of variance in payo¤ (see Appendix 6.1 and 6.2 for a justication).
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j 6= i, (iii) @w (i; i; ) =@ < 0.
Denote by P = hn;X; ; w;i a population with (countably) innitely many islands of
size n, strategy set X, material payo¤ function , tness function w, and type set   F . In
each demographic time period t there is some type distribution t 2  () in the population
at large. The focus of the analysis is on the dynamics of this type distribution. Analysis will
be restricted to type distributions with at most two types present in the population at any
given point in time.
Our model adds two novelties to the existing island model literature. First, an individuals
strategy choice is guided by her preferences and beliefs about her island neighborsstrategy
choices. Second, we distinguish material payo¤s here interpreted as income from both vital
rates (e.g., survival and fecundity) and individual tness (see concrete examples of tness
functions in section 5). Having this three-fold distinction is a novelty for the literature on
preference evolution in economics, in which tness is equated with material payo¤, and for
the evolutionary biology literature, in which payo¤ tends to be equated to fecundity.
2.4 Uninvadability in structured populations
Consider a population P which prior to some date t = 0 is homogenous with some resident
type u. Can this population be invaded by some mutant type v 6= u that appears at time
t = 0 in a single adult individual? By invasionis meant long-run survival of the mutant
type, or, more precisely, that it does not go extinct within nite time. In our model all adults
have a positive probability of dying in each period of their lives, and o¤spring migrate with
positive probability, so for a mutant type v 6= u to be able to invade the population, it must
spread beyond the island where the rst mutant appeared. The initial mutants descendants
may, by way of migration, colonize new islands that were before inhabited exclusively by
the resident type u. Such colonization, as well as survival and fecundity, depends on all
individualsmaterial payo¤s, which in turn depend on the strategy proles used in the
population. The analysis of a residential types invadability or uninvadability is thus an
analysis of (non-linear) stochastic population processes involving both (global) demography
and (local) strategic interactions.
In order to be able to apply results in the biology literature for stochastic evolution
in structured populations to preference evolution, we impose the following homogeneity as-
sumption concerning individuals equilibrium behavior in the subjective game:
[H] On all islands with the same number of mutants, and irrespective of calendar
time, the same Nash equilibrium is played, and all residents use the same strategy
(say, x 2 X), and all mutants use the same strategy (say, y 2 X).
As a consequence, on any given island and in any given demographic time period: all
residents obtain the same tness (which in general depends on their strategy, their island
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neighborsstrategies, and on strategy proles in the population at large), and all mutants
obtain the same tness (which likewise depends on their strategy, their island neighbors
strategies, and on strategy proles in the population at large). Under these conditions, it is
possible to obtain results for the long-run survival, or extinction, of mutants. We proceed in
steps towards a denition and characterization of uninvadability.
First, in a population where all individuals are of the same type u, all individuals use the
same strategy, to be called the resident strategy, and this strategy ~x has to satisfy
~x 2 arg max
x2X
u
 
x; ~x(n 1)

; (1)
where ~x(n 1) is the (n  1)-dimensional vector whose components all equal ~x. We write Xu
for the set of strategies ~x that satisfy (1).10 Condition (1) follows from the homogeneity as-
sumption [H] and the Nash equilibrium requirement that every individual chooses a strategy
that is optimal, given her preferences.
Second, consider a population P initially populated by some resident type u and in which
some strategy in Xu is played by everyone. Let some mutant type v appear in exactly one
individual at time t = 0. Under assumption [H], and for any selection of Nash equilibria, one
equilibrium for all islands with k = 0; 1; :::; n mutants, respectively, this denes a probability
distribution over tness levels in all future demographic time periods. We dene the resident
type u to be uninvadable by v if, for every Nash equilibrium selection, the mutant type v
goes extinct in nite time with probability one.11 A type u 2  is uninvadable in  if it is
uninvadable by all mutant types v 2 .
The notion of lineage tness plays a key role in our characterization of uninvadability.
An individuals lineage consists of all of the individuals descendants, that is, her immediate
descendants (her o¤spring and also herself if she survives), the immediate descendants of her
immediate descendants, etc. ad innitum. The individuals local lineage is the subset of her
lineage members who live, as adults, in the island where she herself became an adult. Our
assumption that the migration rate is positive and constant implies that the random time
T of rst extinction of any individuals local lineage is nite with probability one, and that
in time periods before T local lineage members may produce emigrants settling on other
islands.12
Any selection of Nash equilibrium (in the case of complete information, one equilibrium
for each number of mutants in a group) denes a Markov chain that induces a unique invari-
ant probability distribution over possible mutant local lineage size realizations (including the
10By continuity of the utility function and compactness of the set X, the set of maximands in (1) is
non-empty and compact (by Weierstrassmaximum theorem). Moreover, by Berges maximum theorem, the
set of maximands also dene an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. By Kakutanis xed-point theorem,
the set Xu is therefore non-empty (and compact) if the function u is also quasi-concave in its rst argument
(the players own strategy).
11Extinction is dened as the event that no individual in the population is of the mutant type.
12Even if locally extinct, members of the individuals lineage may still live on other islands. Moreover,
some lineage members may later move to the mutants native island. However, the probability that this
event occurs in nite time is zero.
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realization of the random extinction time T ), and this occurs irrespectively of whether an
island of residents is colonized by a single or several successful mutant emigrants. This prob-
ability distribution in turn can be taken to determine the lineage tness of the mutant type
v given this equilibrium selection, dened as the average w tness of a mutant, the average
being taken over (a) all possible local lineage size realizations (each one before the associ-
ated random period T ) and (b) over all possible initial conditions of a local lineage (single or
multiple simultaneous emigrant mutants). As long as the mutant is rare in the population,
the number of mutants is nite, so the average material payo¤ earned by individuals of the
resident type u in those periods is simply  =  (x; x; :::; x), where x 2 Xu is the resident
strategy in the equilibrium in question.13 For any given selection of Nash equilibrium, under
assumption [H] the lineage tness of a mutant type v 2  in an otherwise homogeneous
population in which all individuals are of type u 2 , can be written in the form
W (v; u) =
n 1X
k=0
pk (v; u)  w ( (vjk) ; h (vjk) ;  (ujk)i ; ) ; (2)
where for each k = 0; :::; n 1, pk (v; u) is the probability for a mutant uniformly drawn from
a local lineage, that k = 0; 1; :::; n   1 of her neighbors are from this lineage,  (vjk) is the
material payo¤ to the mutant at hand, and h (vjk) ;  (ujk)i 2 Rn 1 is the vector of material
payo¤s to the mutants n  1 island neighbors (among whom k have the mutant trait v, and
the other n   1   k have the resident trait u). Hence, the lineage tness of a mutant is
the average individual tness of a representative carrier of the mutant trait. Note that if
there are multiple Nash equilibria, there may be several matching probability distributions
p (v; u) = (p0 (v; u) ; :::; pn 1 (v; u)), one for each selection of Nash equilibrium. Note further
that the lineage tness of the mutant type is well-dened if the mutant type happens to be
identical with the resident type; then all individuals in the population have the same lineage
tness, namely W (u; u) = 1 (since population size is constant).
A positive probability weight pk (v; u) in the denition of W for some k > 0 means
that descendants of the initial mutant face a positive probability of being matched with
each other. The overall level of such assortative matching can be usefully quantied by the
coe¢ cient of pairwise relatedness, dened as
r (v; u) =
n 1X
k=0
k
n  1  pk (v; u) : (3)
This coe¢ cient measures, for any descendant of the initial mutant of type v, the average
share of island neighbors who are also descendants of the initial mutant. When migration
is complete (m = 1, see Section 2.1) or when groups are innitely large (n ! 1), no two
group members can be traced back to an initial common ancestor, and thus pk (v; u) = 0 for
all k > 0, and hence r (v; u) = 0 . But since real-life groups are of nite size, and owing to
the cost of dispersal, essentially all natural populations display positive relatedness between
13Note that because the analysis focuses on the tness of rare mutants in an otherwise homogenous
population, our assumption that the tness function depends on the average material payo¤ in the population
at large, and not on the distribution of the material payo¤s therein, is innocuous.
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group members, i.e., r (v; u) > 0. This in turn implies that pk (v; u) > 0 for at least some
k > 0.14
We denote byW (v; u) the set of lineage tness levels induced by all Nash equilibria com-
patible with types v and u in a given population P. The (potentially empty) setW (v; u)  R
is compact. Extending the characterization in Lehmann et al. (2016) from types with unique
lineage tness values to types with sets of potential lineage tness values,15 uninvadability
can be succinctly characterized as follows: A type u 2  with W (v; u) 6= ? is uninvadable
if and only if
maxW (v; u)  1 8v 2 : (4)
For each mutant type v 2 , this characterization compares the highest possible average
lineage tness of a single initial v-mutant, maxW (v; u), with the lineage tness of any
resident individual, W (u; u) = 1. An uninvadable type u thus preempts entry into the
population in the sense of obtaining (weakly) higher average lineage tness that any mutant
type can ever obtain.
2.5 Nash equilibrium
In order to apply our characterization of uninvadability to preference evolution we need
to get a handle on the set of Nash equilibria, which in turn depends on the informational
assumptions about the strategic interactions on the islands. We know of three settings that
are compatible with homogeneity assumption [H], and that admit analysis. In the rst
setting, each type in the type space   F has exactly one strategy that it will always
use. This is the easiest case, and it can be referred to as strategy evolution.In the second
setting, all types are permitted,  = F , and interactions take place under (maximally)
incomplete information, i.e., each individuals type is his or her private information. In
the third setting, interactions take place under complete information, i.e., every individual
knows the types of all individuals on her island. Under the homogeneity assumption, each
of these settings is amenable to analysis. While one could argue that individuals are likely
more knowledgeable about the type distribution in their own island than in the overall
population, we nonetheless adopt the incomplete information assumption here, and leave
analysis of complete information for future research. The reason is that the incomplete
information setting is not only known to provide benchmark results to which results derived
under complete information assumptions can be fruitfully compared (for a recent survey, see
Alger and Weibull, 2019), but is also likely to be the default case under genetic transmission
since information about genotype is generally incomplete (e.g., Frank 1998, chapter 6).
14This would be true even if migration probabilities were endogenous, as long as migration entails some
cost (for literature with endogenous dispersal decisions, see, e.g., Clobert et al., 2001, Frank, 1998, and
Rousset, 2004, and Hartl and Clark, 2007). The model by Newton (2017) can be interpreted as having
costless migration.
15In Lehmann, Alger, and Weibull (2015) we proved this result for scenarios where new islands can be
colonized only by singleton mutants. Lehmann et al. (2016, eqs. (14)-(16)) extended that result to allow for
scenarios in which multiple o¤spring from the same group can reproduce in the same non-natal island.
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It remains to dene the set of Nash equilibria that will be used to calculate any mutants
lineage tness under incomplete information. We assume that individualsprobabilistic be-
liefs about the type distribution among their neighbors are statistically correct. In particular,
every individual of the resident type u (correctly) believes that all other individuals on his
or her island are (with probability one) of her type, and every mutant (correctly) believes
that the types of his or her island neighbors are drawn according to the mutant lineages
probability distribution p (v; u) = (p0 (v; u) ; :::; pn 1 (v; u)). For any given resident strategy
~x 2 Xu, all mutants are, by homogeneity assumption [H], assumed to use one and the same
strategy, say ~y that, moreover, is a best response for them, with their utility function v, and
given the matching probability distribution that they face:
~y 2 arg max
y2X
n 1X
k=0
pk (~y; ~x)  v
 
y; ~y(k); ~x(n k 1)

: (5)
Here ~y(k) is the strategy vector whose k components all are ~y 2 X, and ~x(n k 1) the strategy
vector whose n   k   1 components all are ~x, and the matching probabilities are from now
on and throughout written directly as a function of the equilibrium strategies played. Given
the resident and mutant types, u; v 2 , a strategy pair (~x; ~y) 2 X2 is a (type-homogenous)
Nash equilibrium if ~x 2 Xu and ~y satises (5). Let BNE (u; v)  X2 denote the set of such
Nash equilibria. Any such Nash equilibrium denes all remaining material payo¤s  (vjk)
and  (ujk) in (2).16
3 Analysis
It turns out that it is useful, as a rst step, to examine preference types which induce
commitment to some particular strategy. To be more specic, let   F consist of all utility
functions u : Xn ! R of the form u (xi;x i)  kxi   xk2 for some x 2 X. All individuals
with types in this set  each have a unique dominant strategy, and we will identify types by
their dominant strategy;  = X. Under such strategy evolution, for a resident type x and a
mutant type y, the set W (y; x) is a singleton, and maxW (y; x) = W (y; x), where
W (y; x) =
n 1X
k=0
pk (y; x)  ~w
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x

: (6)
Here ~w = w   is the composite function which gives the tness of any individual i who
plays strategy xi 2 X when the others on his or her island play x i 2 Xn 1, while some
strategy x 2 X is played by all individuals on all other islands:
~w (xi;x i; x) = w

 (xi;x i) ; ( (xj;x j))j 6=i ;  (x
; :::; x)

: (7)
16The reader may worry about model robustness at this point. For if the total population is large but
nite, then the probability is not zero, but small and positive, that there will at least one mutant in a
given residents island. However, for su¢ ciently large populations (with xed island size n), the probability
that a mutant is present in a residents island is so small that, by upper hemi-continuity of the best-reply
correspondence of any u 2 F , the set of Nash equilibrium strategies for the residents when mutants are very
rare in their islands, can be kept within arbitrarily small distance from the set Xu.
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The population size being constant over time, we note that ~w
 
x;x(n 1); x

= 1 for all
x 2 X. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a strategy x 2 X to be uninvadable under
strategy evolution is readily obtained by applying condition (4), resulting in:
n 1X
k=0
pk (y; x)  ~w
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x
  1 8y 2 X: (8)
Equivalently, an uninvadable strategy x can be seen as preempting entry into the population
by earning the maximal lineage tness that can be obtained in a population where the
resident strategy is x; that is
x 2 arg max
y2X
n 1X
k=0
pk (y; x)  ~w
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x

: (9)
In other words, a strategy is uninvadable if and only if it is a best reply to itself in terms of
lineage tness. We denote by X^ (P) the (potentially empty) set of uninvadable strategies in
population P = hn;X; ; w;i.
As a second step we use these observations to write the condition for a type u 2 F to be
uninvadable, (4), in an operational form:
n 1X
k=0
pk (y; x)  ~w
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x
  1 8v 2 F and 8 (x; y) 2 BNE (u; v) : (10)
This immediately leads to our rst result.
Proposition 1 In a population P, a utility function u is uninvadable in F if and only if
Xu  X^ (P).
In other words, for a utility function to be uninvadable, it must induce resident Nash
equilibrium strategies that are all uninvadable. However, a utility function does not need to
give rise to all uninvadable strategies in resident Nash equilibrium; any strategy in X^ (P)
that would not belong to Xu would simply not be played by residents, and would thus not
be subject to potential invasion by mutants.17
The expression on the left-hand side of (10), however, shows that characterization of
uninvadable preferences involves a major challenge, because the matching probabilities may
depend both on the resident and mutant strategies, in all time periods when mutants are
around.18 In the second part of the analysis below, we analyze a model in which independence
17Note that the proposition implies that strategy-committed types that are uninvadable by other strategy-
committed types, are uninvadable by all preference types. Indeed, if X^ = fx^g, then u 2 F is uninvadable
if and only if Xu = fx^g. Moreover, this is true even if the residents would have preferences that do not
entail commitment to a particular strategy, as long as these preferences induce them to play the uninvadable
strategy in residential Nash equilibrium.
18Obtaining exact expressions for the matching probabilities is typically hard. However, their values can
be approximated (see Appendix 6.7 for an approximation method).
15
of the matching probabilities on the strategies played arises endogenously. This model will
allow us to fully characterize the set of uninvadable preferences at the level of material
payo¤s. Prior to that, however, we report results on uninvadable preferences at the level of
tnesses.
3.1 Utility and tness
In spite of the challenge posed by the dependence of the matching probabilities on the
strategies played by residents and mutants, we show that one particular class of utility
functions stands out, in the sense that there always exists a utility function in this class for
which some resident strategy is uninvadable.
3.1.1 The general case
For any given strategy x 2 X, let the utility function ux : Xn ! R be dened by
ux (xi;x i) = Ep(xi;x) [ ~w (xi; ~z i; x
) j (xi;x i)] 8(xi;x i) 2 Xn; (11)
where p (xi; x) = (p0 (xi; x) ; p1 (xi; x) ; :::; pn 1 (xi; x)) is the vector of matching proba-
bilities that would be induced in population P if residents played x and mutants played
xi. Here ~z i is a random strategy-prole such that with probability pk (xi; x) (for each
k = 0; 1; ::; n   1) exactly k of the n   1 components in x i are replaced by xi, with equal
probability for each such subset of k replaced components, while the remaining components
in x i keep their original value. Then:
Proposition 2 Any utility function ux^ of the form (11) such that Xux^ = fx^g is uninvadable
in F . Moreover, each uninvadable strategy x^ is also a resident strategy under the utility
function ux^.
This proposition identies a su¢ cient condition for a utility function of the form (11) to
be uninvadable. The condition is that the utility function has a unique resident strategy.
Moreover, if the population structure admits multiple uninvadable strategies, then there are
multiple utility functions of the form (11) that may be uninvadable, one for each x^ 2 X^ (P).
Interestingly, then, di¤erent utility functions may arise in di¤erent populations with the
same population structure. The reason is that the residential strategy a¤ects the matching
probabilities (which further explains why this result di¤ers sharply from models in which
the assortativity in the matching process is exogenous). There may of course be other unin-
vadable utility functions than those of the form (11) (see below). Nonetheless, Proposition
2 has a powerful implication: any uninvadable utility function must give rise to a resident
strategy that is also a resident strategy under ux^ for some x^ 2 X^ (P).
An individual with the utility function ux can be seen as following a probabilistic version
of Kants categorical imperative (Kant, 1785) at the tness level; she evaluates the strategies
at her disposal in the light of what would happen to her own tness in the hypothetical
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scenario in which others would probabilistically use her strategy, according to the proba-
bility distribution p (xi; x).19 For illustrative purposes, we state ux explicitly for n = 2
(then calling own strategy xi and the opponents strategy xj) and n = 3 (then calling the
opponentsstrategies xj and xk):
ux (xi; xj) = p0 (xi; x
)  ~w (xi; xj; x) + p1 (xi; x)  ~w (xi; xi; x) (12)
ux (xi; xj; xk) = p0 (xi; x
)  ~w (xi; xj; xk; x) + p1 (xi; x
)
2
 ~w (xi; xi; xk; x) (13)
+
p1 (xi; x
)
2
 ~w (xi; xj; xi; x) + p2 (xi; x)  ~w (xi; xi; xi; x) :
Note that the weights p (xi; x) in the ux utility function depend on the individuals own
strategy xi in the present, whereas in the lineage tness the matching probabilities depend on
the strategy played by mutants individuals living over several (and past) demographic time
periods. This highlights the di¤erence between lineage tness, which is an objective measure,
and utility, which is subjective. The dependence of the weights p (xi; x) on own strategy
xi, however, questions the operational relevance of ux as an analytically and conceptually
useful utility function. As such, we now turn to study cases where the matching probabilities
in the lineage tness no longer depend on the mutantsstrategy; this will enable us to turn
to utility functions with weights that do not depend on the individuals strategy.
3.1.2 The di¤erentiable case
Suppose that the following di¤erentiability assumption holds:20
[D] (i) X = R, (ii)  : Rn ! R is continuously di¤erentiable, and (iii) pk : X2 ! [0; 1]
is di¤erentiable for all k 2 f0; 1; :::; n  1g.
In the next proposition, which states a necessary condition for a strategy x^ to be unin-
vadable, r (x^; x^) is the coe¢ cient of pairwise relatedness (see (3)) in a population where all
individuals play x^, and a subscript i on ~w denotes the partial derivative with respect to the
i-th argument.
Proposition 3 If [D] holds and x^ 2 X^ (P), then
~w1
 
x^; x^(n 1); x^

+ r (x^; x^)
nX
j=2
~wj
 
x^; x^(n 1); x^

= 0: (14)
19These preferences are reminiscent of homo moralis preferences (Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016). However,
there are two important distinctions. First, here the utility function is dened for a certain reference strategy.
Second, the weights attached to the di¤erent terms in the utility function depend on the strategy used by
the individual at hand.
20The uni-dimensionality assumption is inessential. All analysis can be carried out in terms of gradients,
but with little gain in terms of qualitative insight. For brevity and clarity, we therefore stay with the
unidimensional case.
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The rst term is the marginal tness benet of the individuals own strategy, while the
second term is the sum of the marginal tness benets conferred by others, weighted by
the coe¢ cient of pairwise relatedness. This equation is nothing but the marginal version of
Hamiltons rule (Hamilton, 1964, 1970, Franck, 1998), which provides the necessary rst-
order condition for an (interior) strategy to be uninvadable (see equation (3) in Taylor and
Frank, 1996, or equation (7.5) in Rousset, 2004).21 Such rst-order conditions are standard
in the biology literature, but for the sake of completeness we provide a proof in the appendix.
Consider the utility function dened by
~ux^ (xi;x i) = [1  r (x^; x^)]  ~w (xi;x i; x^) + r (x^; x^)  ~w

xi;x
(n 1)
i ; x^

; (15)
where x^ 2 X^ (P), and x(n 1)i 2 Xn 1 is the strategy vector whose n 1 components all equal
xi. Clearly, Propositions 1 and 3 together imply that if x^ is the unique resident strategy
under ~ux^, then this utility function is uninvadable.
An individual equipped with the utility function in (15) evaluates her strategy, xi, both
in terms of how it a¤ects her own tness, given the neighborsstrategies and the strategy
played in the population at large, reected in the rst term, and how her strategy xi would
a¤ect her tness should her neighbors, hypothetically, also use it, reected in the second
term. This is reminiscent of homo moralis preferences (see, in particular, Proposition 3 of
Alger and Weibull, 2016), although an important di¤erence is that here the utility function
in (15) is dened for a certain reference strategy.
3.2 Utility and material payo¤s
We now turn to an approach in which the matching probabilities still depend on the trans-
mission process but are independent of the strategies used. This approach, in biology called
weak selection (see, e.g., Nagylaki, 1992, 1993), assumes that tness e¤ects from the in-
teraction in question are small. Arguably, this approach is highly relevant for the social
sciences, since it generates predictions regarding those preferences that guide behaviors in
minor everyday interactions, those with only small e¤ects on lifetime tness.
3.2.1 Weak selection
Formally: for each x 2 X and y 2 Xn 1 let an individuals material payo¤ be a convex
combination of two terms,
() (x;y) = (1  )  0 +    (x;y) ; (16)
21First-order conditions like equation (14) apply more generally to traits if lineage tness and individual
tness are di¤erentiable in trait values. The aforementioned evolutionary dynamics literature focuses on
the evolution of phenotypes the composite of an organisms characteristics thus subsuming virtually any
heritable trait and can be applied to essentially any demographic scenario (see Rousset, 2004, for general
results).
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where 0 is baseline material payo¤, assumed identical for all individuals, and  2 (0; 1) is
the share of the material payo¤ that emanates from the present material game interaction.
This factor  is the intensity of selection. Thus, for  2 (0; 1) xed, the tness of individual
i is now of the form
w (i;  i; ) = w

(1  ) 0 + i; ((1  ) 0 + j)j 6=i ; (1  ) 0 + 

: (17)
Weak selection amounts to considering the limit as  tends towards 0.22 Importantly,
under weak selection, the matching probabilities, while still depending on the transmission
process, do not depend on the strategies x and y (for any population P = hn;X; ; w;i
satisfying assumption [M]). The probability for a randomly drawn descendant of an ancestor,
be it a resident or mutant, to coexist in its island with k other descendants of the same
ancestor is then solely determined by the vital rates in a population in which everybody uses
the same strategy x, no matter which. In biology this is referred to as the neutral process.
This in turn has profound implications for the ability of a mutant trait to invade, since it
means that the strategy played by residents matters only insofar as it a¤ects the local success
of mutants.
Let p0 =
 
p00; p
0
1; :::; p
0
n 1

denote the vector of matching probabilities induced by the
neutral process. Proposition 2 still holds under weak selection: individuals playing some
uninvadable strategy x^ 2 X^ (P) may be viewed as if they were striving to maximize the
utility function ux^, with the matching prole now given by p0. This utility function is
a sum of individual tnesses. However, as is shown in the next proposition, under weak
selection there is also an uninvadable utility function which describes preferences at the level
of material payo¤s, and which does not depend on any reference strategy. Let v0 : Xn ! R
be dened by
v0 (xi;x i) = Ep0
"
 (xi; ~z i)  0 
P
j 6=i
 (~zj; ~z j) j (xi;x i)
#
8 (xi;x i) 2 Xn; (18)
where ~z i is dened in the same way as in (11), and
0 = lim
!0
 (x) (19)
is the coe¢ cient of tness interdependence under weak selection, where
 (x) =  
 X
j 6=i
@w (i; i; )
@j
!
=

@w (i; i; )
@i

; (20)
evaluated when all individuals in the population use the same strategy x 2 X. Hence, 0
measures the marginal e¤ect of neighborsmaterial payo¤s on own tness, relative to the
marginal e¤ect of own material payo¤on own tness, in a population in which all individuals
play the same strategy, and in the limit as  tends to zero. A positive coe¢ cient 0 can be
22This formalization of weak selection corresponds to what Wild and Traulsen (2007) call w-weak selection.
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interpreted as there being competition for local resources: an increase in the material payo¤s
to neighbors then reduces an individuals tness. A negative coe¢ cient 0 means that there
is a positive externality at the level of material payo¤s between neighbors: an increase in
the material payo¤s to neighbors then increases an individuals tness.
Our next result establishes that selection favors the so-dened utility function, which was
used in the context of strategy evolution in Lehmann, Alger, and Weibull (2015), and rejects
other utility functions unless they induce an identical best reply to some resident equilibrium
for v0:
Proposition 4 The utility function v0 is uninvadable in  = F under weak selection. A
utility function u 2  is invadable under weak selection if 9~x 2 Xu such that ~x =2 Xv0.
Moreover, 1  n  0  1.
An individual with the utility function v0 is but that of the familiar Homo oeconomicus if
0 = 0 and p00 = 1. By contrast, if 0 6= 0 and p00 < 1, the individual evaluates any strategy
prole (xi;x i) by pondering his expected material payo¤ advantage over his neighbors,
 (xi; ~z i)   0 
P
j 6=i (~zj; ~z j), if all, some, or none of the others in her island would use
the same strategy as herself (drawn randomly according to p0), instead of playing their
strategies, given by x i.
To illustrate how the v0 goal function is related to preferences studied in behavioral
and experimental economics, we briey consider the two-player case. By writing the utility
function as
v0(xi; xj) = (1  0)
 
1  p01

 (xi; xj) + (1  0) p01 (xi; xi) (21)
+ 0
 
1  p01

[ (xi; xj)   (xj; xi)] ;
it can be interpreted as the sum of three terms, where the rst represents pure self-interest
(own material payo¤), the second a Kantian concern (what is the right thing to do if others
in the population act like me), and the third a comparison with the Joneses(the di¤erence
between own material payo¤ and that of the neighbor). Note also that a positive weight
0 > 0 expresses a form of envy or spite; if instead 0 < 0, then it is as if individuals care
positively, or altruistically, about their neighborsmaterial payo¤s.
Remark 1 Part of the economics literature on the evolutionary stability of strategies and
preferences relies on models in which rare mutants may have a positive probability of being
matched with each other, even in the limit as the share of mutants tends to zero (Bergstrom,
2003, Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016). These limit matching probabilities are taken to be
independent of the strategies being played. Hence, they may be interpreted as the vector of
matching probabilities p0 in the neutral process.
3.2.2 The di¤erentiable case
We nally turn to return to the general model, i.e., selection need not be weak, and consider
settings where [D] holds. In a population in which all individuals play x, let  (x) denote
20
the coe¢ cient of scaled relatedness, dened as
 (x) =
r (x; x)  1
n 1 (x) [1 + (n  2) r (x; x)]
1   (x) r (x; x) : (22)
Then we obtain a result that (unlike Proposition 3) is new to the evolutionary biology
literature:23
Proposition 5 If [D] holds and x^ 2 X^ (P), then
[1   (x^)]  1
 
x^; x^(n 1)

+  (x^) 
nX
j=1
j
 
x^; x^(n 1)

= 0: (23)
Like r(x^; x^), the coe¢ cient  (x^) can be interpreted as a marginal substitution rate: it
gives the number of units of own material payo¤ that any given individual is willing to
forgo to increase the material payo¤ of each neighbor by one unit. Absent any tness
interdependence, i.e., if  (x^) = 0,  (x^) would simply equal relatedness r (x^; x^). To see
exactly how  (x^) accounts for tness interdependence, consider rst the case when there is
but one neighbor, that is n = 2. A payo¤transfer to this neighbor increases competition from
the neighbor at rate  (x^) (since  (x^) measures the relative increase in competition in the
neighborhood of an individual when its payo¤ is varied, see (20)). The tness benet to the
donor from giving the transfer to the neighbor is thus reduced by  (x^), so that the numerator
in (22) becomes r (x^; x^)   (x^). Moreover, a transfer of resources to the neighbor alleviates
the competition that the neighbor experiences, and the neighbor is related to the donor
according to coe¢ cient r (x^; x^). Hence, the cost of the transfer is reduced by  (x^) r (x^; x^),
which explains the denominator in (22).
When there are multiple neighbors, n > 2, a transfer given to one neighbor enhances
the competition by  (x^) = (n  1), but also for the (n  2) other neighbors, each of which
is related to the donor according to coe¢ cient r (x^; x^). Therefore, the tness benet of
the transfer to the donor is reduced by  (x^) = (n  1) times the term in square brackets in
the numerator; which explains the numerator of  (x^). In the denominator, the cost of the
transfer is still reduced by  (x^) r (x^; x^), which is the expected alleviation of competition that
23To be more explicit about this statement, we note that rst-order conditions similar to the one in (23)
appear elsewhere in the evolutionary biology literature, but then under the form f1
 
x^; x^(n 1)

+ ~ (x^) Pn
j 6=1 fj
 
x^; x^(n 1)

= 0, where f is the fecundity of an individual (see Lehmann and Rousset, 2010, Akçay
and van Cleve, 2012, Van Cleve, 2015, Dos-Santos and Peña, 2017). We would obtain the exact same
expression if in our model tness depended solely on fecundity, since then derivatives of fecundity with respect
to material payo¤s would cancel from rst-order conditions (to see this, set survival to zero in the tness
function in (26) in Section 4). Our model generalizes previous models, since Proposition 5 applies regardless
of whether tness depends only on fecundity, or also on individual and/or group survival (see Section 4 for
examples of tness functions), and it makes explicit the role of the coe¢ cient of tness interdependence.
Further, it demonstrates that even if r (x^; x^) = 0, the substitution rate  (x^) can be substantial depending on
the scenario (see, in particular, the examples in Section 4.2). As such, our results unify and extend previous
ones of the evolutionary biology literature.
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the transfer induces for the individuals neighbors (recall that  (x^) accounts for all neighbors
through the term (n  1)).
In view of the necessary rst-order condition (23), it may be of interest to consider the
utility functions vx^ 2 F dened by
vx^ (xi;x i) = [1   (x^)]   (xi;x i) +  (x^)  

xi;x
(n 1)
 i

; (24)
where x^ 2 X^ (P). Since (23) implies that x^ satises the necessary rst-order condition for
an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium of the n-player game in which all players have utility
function vx^, Proposition 1 implies that vx^ is an uninvadable utility function if x^ is the unique
resident strategy under vx^.
In sum, in a population in which all individuals play some interior uninvadable strategy
x^, these individuals may (under some conditions) be perceived as having a Kantian concern
at the tness level as well as at the material payo¤ level. Importantly, the strength of
the Kantian (or other-regarding) concern at the tness level, measured by r (x^; x^), typically
di¤ers from the strength of the Kantian (or other-regarding) concern at the material payo¤
level, measured by  (x^), as shown next:
Proposition 6 Suppose that [D] holds and that vx^ is uninvadable. The weight  (x^) attached
to the neighborsmaterial payo¤s in the function vx^ lies in the interval [ 1; 1]. Furthermore,
 (x^) > r (x^; x^) if and only if  (x^) < 0.
We note that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for  (x^) to be negative is that in a
population where everybody plays x^, @w (i; i; ) =@j is positive (this partial derivative
being the same for all j 6= i). We nally note that under weak selection (22) becomes:
0 =
r0   1n 10 [1 + (n  2) r0]
1  0r0 ; (25)
where 0 is dened in (19) and r0 = lim!0 r (x; x).
4 Three canonical scenarios
We have reported general theoretical results on how tness consequences of material payo¤s
may be expected to a¤ect preferences over material payo¤ outcomes. In this section we
apply these general results by examining three canonical evolutionary scenarios. For each
scenario we calculate the associated coe¢ cients of relatedness r, tness interdependence ,
and scaled relatedness  (all the calculations can be found in the appendix). Once these
coe¢ cients have been identied, equations (18), (15) and (24) provide closed-form represen-
tations of uninvadable utility functions, expressed in terms of the material payo¤ function
that represents the strategic interaction at hand. We note that these coe¢ cients are inde-
pendent of the material payo¤ function in question, so the obtained utility representations
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can be carried over from one material game to any other material game. Also, for all these
scenarios the approximate explicit expression for the matching probabilities can be applied
(see equation (78) in the Appendix), so the preferences can be fully evaluated in terms of
the aforementioned coe¢ cients.
4.1 Scenario A: Genes
If types are genetically determined, a possible tness function is:
w (i; i; ) = s (i) + m  [1  s ()]n  f (i)
nf ()
(26)
+ (1 m) 
 
n 
nX
j=1
s (j)
!
 f (i)
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf () ;
where s (i) 2 [0; 1] is the probability that i survives to the next demographic time period,
f (i) > 0 is is expected number of o¤spring (who will have inherited is type), and 0 <
m  1 is the probability for each o¤spring to migrate to another island. These vital events
survival, reproduction and migration are assumed to be statistically independent. In each
island the deceased adults, if any, are replaced by (uniformly) randomly drawn aspiring
o¤spring, native and immigrant. The fortunate ones settle and become adults while the
unfortunate ones die. The third term is thus the expected number of is o¤spring who
manage to secure a breeding spoton the natal island. It is the product of three factors:
(a) the probability for not migrating, (1 m); (b) the number of available spots on the
island; and, for each available spot, (c) the competition for the spot, among native and
migrating o¤spring from other islands, where f () is he fecundity in the population at
large. The second term is the expected number of is o¤spring who migrate and manage
to secure a breeding spot on another island: each o¤spring who migrates to another island
competes against nf () other individuals for the n available spots.
Remark 2 For a more detailed derivation of an equation like (26) from the random variables
that underlie survival and reproduction, see Lehmann and Balloux (2007). In particular,
since the total number of islands is innite, the probability is zero for the event that more
than one of is o¤spring happen to migrate to the same island. Moreover, when the expected
number of o¤spring is large, as we here assume, then the event that there are fewer aspiring
o¤spring than there are available slots in an island is negligible, and the ratios between the
expected numbers of o¤spring, in (26), equal the expectations of the ratios of the underlying
random numbers of o¤spring.
Considering the case where the survival probability is constant, s (i) = s0, the coe¢ cient
of relatedness equals
r (x; x) =
(1 m)2 + s0 (1 m2)
n  (n  1) (1 m)2 + s0 [1 + (n  1)m2]
; (27)
23
and the coe¢ cient of tness interdependence equals
 (x) =
(n  1) (1 m)2
n  (1 m)2 : (28)
Both coe¢ cients turn out to be independent of the reference strategy x. Hence, the utility
functions ux and vx, dened in equations (15) and (24), are independent of what strategy
x is used in the population at large and can, in this evolutionary scenario, be explicitly
parametrized in terms of the migration rate m, group size n, and survival probability s0.
Both r (x; x) and  (x) are strictly positive for all n, all m 2 (0; 1), and all s0 2 (0; 1).
By contrast, if m = 1, the probability of interacting with an individual from the same
lineage is nil, r (x; x) = 0, and, moreover, there is no tness benet from out-competing
neighbors materially,  (x) = 0. Moreover, both coe¢ cients are decreasing in m, and r (x; x)
is increasing in s0. Substituting (27) and (28) into (22), we obtain:
 (x) =
2 (1 m) s0
2 (1 m) s0 + n [2 m (1  s0)] ; (29)
which is strictly positive for any m 2 (0; 1) and s0 > 0, but nil for m = 1 and for s0 = 0.
In other words, in this evolutionary scenario, when s0 = 0 but m 2 (0; 1), any uninvadable
utility function must be as if individuals are pro-social at the level of tnesses (r (x; x) > 0),
but are purely selsh at the level of material payo¤s ( (x) = 0). Furthermore, a positive
survival probability s0 > 0 induces pro-sociality ( (x) > 0). However, note that  (x)
is decreasing in island size n and in migration rate m. In fact, it vanishes as n becomes
innitely large. Figure 1 shows how  (x) depends on m when s0 = 1=n, for n = 2 (black
solid) and n = 10 (black dashed), and when s0 = 0:8 for n = 2 (blue) and n = 10 (blue
dashed), as well as s0 = 0 (pink).
Figure 1: The value of  (x) as a function of the migration rate m.
Remark 3 In the biology literature, the island model has become a work-horse model to an-
alyze conditions favoring pro- and anti-sociality at the level of survival and reproduction in
spatially structured populations. This literature has a well-known result known as Taylors
24
cancellation result, a useful yardstick for understanding how changes in the transmission
scenario can tip the balance either in the direction of pro-sociality or anti-sociality. Our
result that  (x) = 0 for s0 = 0 is in line with this result. When s0 = 0, (14) boils down
to n2m (2 m) f 0 ( (x^)) = 0, which implies that f 0 ( (x^)) = 0: in spite of a positive relat-
edness, uninvadability requires simple maximization of own fecundity. This holds true even
if fecundity depends directly on the underlying trait, the standard assumption in the biology
literature (see also Footnote 23), without being a function of some material payo¤. It is this
observation which is known as Taylors cancellation result, noticed initially in agent-based
simulations by Wilson, Pollock, and Dugatkin (1992), proven formally by Taylor (1992a) for
the island model, and then shown to hold for arbitrary migration patterns between groups
(e.g., Taylor, 1992b, Rousset, 2004, and Ohtsuki, 2012). To see that it is in line with our
result that  (x) = 0 for s0 = 0, note that since f is strictly increasing in , f 0 ( (x^)) = 0
in turn implies that x^ maximizes , i.e., 0 (x^) = 0. Finally, we note that the same ex-
pression as that in the right hand side of eq. (29) was rst obtained by Taylor and Irwin
(2000, their eq. A.10), as a marginal cost to benet ratio at the level of fecundity (see also
Akçay and van Cleve, 2012). There is by now an extensive theoretical literature seeking to
delineate how the assumptions pertaining to demography, life-history, the environment, and
the modes of transmission, tip the balance in favor of pro- or anti-sociality at the survival or
fecundity level (see, e.g., Eshel, 1972, Aoki, 1982, Gardner and West, 2006, Johnstone and
Cant, 2008, Lehmann, Foster, and Feldman, 2008, Lion and Gandon, 2010, Bao and Wild,
2012, and Micheletti, Ruxton, and Gardner, 2017, for a some representative case studies,
and Lehmann and Rousset, 2010, for a review).
4.2 Scenario B: Guns
Take the biological scenario A with non-overlapping generations (set s () = 0 for all ),
and augment it by introducing wars between groups. Following play of the material game
in a demographic time period, but before reproduction, death of the adults, and migration
by the o¤spring, islands are randomly engaged in pairwise wars, under exogenous uniform
random matching. In each war, one island wins and the other loses. All individuals in the
losing island thus die before they reproduce; the winning island takes over all reproductive
resources of the other island and thus doubles its members fecundity. Technically, the
double-sized pool of o¤spring of the winning island will split in two halves, one for each
of the two islands, that they will treat as their home island. Let 0    1 denote the
probability that any given island is drawn into war, the war risk, and let g (; ) denote the
conditional probability that an island with material payo¤ prole  2 Rn wins a war when
the average payo¤ in the rest of the population is , conditional on being drawn into war.
Here g is assumed to be increasing and permutation invariant with respect to the material
payo¤s earned by the inhabitants of the island in question. In other words, for  xed, g
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has the properties of standard welfare functions. In this scenario the tness function is
w (i; i; ) = [(1  ) + 2g (; )] 

m  f (i)
f ()
+ (30)
(1 m)n  f (i)
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf ()
#
:
The di¤erence with the baseline scenario is the rst factor, which contains two terms: the
probability that the individuals island will not go to war (1 ), and the probability that the
island will go to war and win times two (2g (; )), where the factor two comes from the
assumption that a winning island doubles its fecundity and spreads its o¤spring uniformly
over the two islands it now possesses. To see why the second factor is the same as the
right-hand side of (26), note that migrants who arrive at any island, irrespective of whether
this island has been involved in war or not, come with probability 1   from an island that
was not in war, and (recalling that the average probability of winning a war is 1/2) with
probability =2 from an island that won a war. Moreover, victorious islands send out twice
as many migrants as islands that did not go to war. Hence, the expected number of migrants
who compete for the breeding spots in any given island ism (1  + 2=2)f () = mf (),
the same as in the absence of wars.
The coe¢ cient of relatedness turns out to coincide with that in the preceding scenario
(for s0 = 0). This is because the only event in which a randomly drawn individual can belong
to the same local lineage as a randomly drawn neighbor, is when both belong to an island
which did not lose a war, and both stayed in their natal island. Since the risk of losing a war
applies to the whole island, while the migration probability applies to the individual, only
the latter matters for relatedness. The coe¢ cient of tness interdependence equals
 (x) =  
(n  1)
h
2gn (
; )  (1 m)2f 0()
nf()
i
2gn (; )  [n  (1 m)2] f 0()nf()
; (31)
where  is the n-dimensional vector whose components all equal  and gn denotes the
partial derivative of g with respect to the n-th argument (since g is evaluated in a homogenous
population here, and since g is invariant under permutation of the n rst arguments, gn
simply captures the marginal e¤ect of an increase in the material payo¤of any island member
on the probability of winning a war). While the expression is involved, it can readily be seen
(by considering a scenario in which f 0 () = 0, for instance) that the e¤ect of material
payo¤s on the strength in wars can make  (x) negative, while in the scenario without wars
studied above, it is always positive. In other words, conicts between groups reduces spite,
and may even reduce it so much that it turns into altruism, i.e., a positive weight is attached
to the neighborsmaterial payo¤s. Indeed, by substituting (27) (for s0 = 0) and (31) into
(22), we obtain:
 (x) =

+ (2 m)m
2gn(;)
f 0()
f()
; (32)
which is increasing in the marginal e¤ect gn on the probability of winning wars.
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We next turn to weak selection in order to obtain more explicit results on the e¤ects
of wars on tness interdependence and scaled relatedness. Recalling the notation under
weak selection (see (16)), let each individuals fecundity be exponentially increasing in the
individuals material payo¤,
f (i) = f0  exp ((1  f )  0 + f  i) ; (33)
where f0 > 0 is baseline fecundity and f > 0 represents the intensity of selection with
respect to fecundity. Furthermore, assume that the probability of winning a war depends on
the two islandsaggregate material payo¤s according to
g (; ) =
exp (V ())
exp (V ()) + exp (V ())
; (34)
where  = (1  )0 + v and  = (1  )0 + v (where 0 is the n-dimensional
vector whose components all equal 0) and V : Rn ! R is a strictly increasing symmetric
function (like any standard welfare function). Its values V () and V () represent the
strengths of the two islands. This is a logistic version of the Tullock contest function
(Tullock, 1980), see Skaperdas (1996). It spans a continuum of cases, from all islands having
the same chance to win any war, if the intensity of selection with respect to wars be nil,
to the case in which the materially wealthiest island is almost sure to win any war (is the
intensity of selection is innitely large). Letting f = f  in equation (33) and v = v , for
non-negative parameters f  0, v  0, and  > 0, we can let both sensitivity parameters
tend to zero at proportional rates by focusing on the limit as  ! 0. Below, however, we let
v = f , and thus write  for v.
Many scenarios can be imagined, of which we consider two. First, if an islands strength
is proportional to its total material payo¤, i.e., if V () = (1  )n0 + 
Xn
i=1
i, then
tness interdependence takes the following form (see the appendix):
0 =
(n  1) (1 m)2    (n  1)n=2
n  (1 m)2 + n=2 : (35)
This changes sign when the risk of war is  = 2 (1 m)2 =n; it is positive at lower risks of war
and negative at higher risk levels for war. Since in the baseline scenario with non-overlapping
generations uninvadability under weak selection requires individuals to be selsh on balance
(see Section 3.2), the reduction in tness interdependence that the war risk entails, leads to
pro-sociality on balance; indeed, for any  > 0 we obtain 0 > 0:
0 =

+ 2m (2 m) : (36)
Moreover, the threat of war ( > 0) nourishes pro-sociality: 0 is increasing in the risk of
war, , and is independent of group size, n.24 Figure 2 shows 0 as a function of the migration
24In the early evolutionary biology literature, which considered traits a¤ecting environmentally induced
group extinction (e.g., Eshel, 1972, Aoki, 1982), pro-sociality at the fecundity level (the equivalent of ~
referred to in Footnote 23) is usually a decreasing function of n (see also Lehmann and Rousset, 2010).
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rate m, for war risk  = 0 (the pink curve),  = 0:4 (the orange curve), and  = 0:8 (the
blue curve).25
Figure 2: The value of 0 as a function of the migration rate m.
Second, while it is arguably a natural benchmark case to assume that the probability of
winning a war depends on the groups total material payo¤, sometimes the success or failure
in conicts depends on the strongest or the weakest member of ones group.26 A general
case, that allows for intermediate cases between dependence on the groups total material
payo¤ and its minimal payo¤, is obtained by using a CES-functional form. Let
V () =
h
(1  )  nc0 +  
Xn
i=1
ci
i1=c
(37)
for some c 6= 0. For c = 1 we obtain the previous case, and as c !  1, V () !
mini f(1  )  0 +   ig (Leontie¤ production function). Hence, when c is negative and
large in absolute terms, an increase in the poorest group members material payo¤ will
increase the winning probability, and hence have a positive e¤ect on otherstness. This
suggests a Rawlsian, rather than a Benthamite concern for other group membersmaterial
well-being. Individuals with medium or high material payo¤s may then behave as if they
had a particular concern for individuals with low payo¤.
4.3 Scenario C: Culture
Suppose now that types are carried over from one generation to the next by cultural trans-
mission. In every demographic time period, each adult dies and is replaced by exactly one
25The analytical models of Bowles (2006, 2009) for the evolution of parochial altruismare also close to
our scenario with wars; in particular, the expected number of groups [1  + 2 (; )] to which a focal
group has access for reproduction after warfare also appears in Bowless formalization. However, since in
his model there are no explicit assumptions that allow to close the lifecycle, it is impossible to derive the
explicit values of 0, r0, and 0 for his model.
26A host of other hypotheses about group strength could be explored, see, e.g., Konrad (2014) and the
references therein.
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child, who searches for a type to emulate, from its deceased (single) parent, another adult
in its island, or an adult in another island. With probability s (i) 2 [0; 1], the loyalty of is
child, the (unique) child of individual i, emulates its parents type. With probability 1 m a
non-loyal child searches for a type to emulate among the (now dead) grown-ups in its natal
island (including its own parent). With the complementary probability, m > 0, such a child
draws a sample of n grown-ups from the population at large, and emulates the type of one of
them. The probability that an adult on any island is chosen as role model, when compared
to others in her island (by a non-loyal child), depends on her types attractiveness relative
to the attractiveness of the other grown-upstypes in her island. Likewise, the probability
that a child who searches outside its native island will pick a certain island, when looking for
a role model, is assumed to be proportional to the islands relative attractiveness in the
world at large. Fitness w (i; i; ) is then the expected number of children who emulate
their type from an individual with material payo¤ i when the other island members earn
the material payo¤ vector  i, and individuals in all other islands earn material payo¤ :
w (i; i; ) = s (i) + m  [1  s ()]  f (i)
f ()
(38)
+ (1 m) 
 
n 
nX
j=1
s (j)
!
 f (i)Pn
j=1 f (j)
;
where, for any individual j in is island, f (j) > 0 is the attractiveness of the type used by
j. The rst term in (38) is the probability that is child loyally emulates its parents type,
without comparison with other adultstypes.27 The second term concerns the event that
children from other islands emulate their type from one of the parents on is island. Written
more explicitly, this term can be spelled out as
mn [1  s ()] 
Pn
j=1 f (j)
n  f () 
f (i)Pn
j=1 f (j)
; (39)
where the rst factor is the expected number of children who search outside their native
islands, the second factor is the probability for each such child to decide for is island, and
the third is the conditional probability that it will then choose i as role model. The third
term concerns the event that some or all the children in is island emulate their type from
one among the parents on the island. The product of the rst two factors in this term is
the expected number of such children and the third factor is the probability, for each such
27In the economics literature on cultural transmission of traits, a commonly used model is that of Bisin and
Verdier (2001). Like in our model, in Bisin and Verdier (2001) each grown-up has exactly one child, and each
child inherits its parents trait with some probability, and otherwise it inherits the trait of another grown-up
in the population. By contrast to our model, the population is not structured into islands, and there is no
strategic interaction between individuals. Furthermore, in their model a parent cares about whether her
child has the same trait as her, but not about whether the child inherited this trait from the parent or from
someone else. Denoting by q the population share of individuals with trait  in the population, and by
s (q) the probability that a child inherits its trait vertically from its parent, their equation (1) says that the
unique child of a parent with trait  acquires trait  with probability s (q) + [1  s (q)]  q. Thus, in the
their model it is only the frequency of the trait that determines the transmission probability; in our model
the attractiveness of a trait also plays a role.
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child, that it will choose to imitate individual i. Note that, comparing this scenario to the
biological scenario with overlapping generations, loyalty plays a similar role to survival, and
attractiveness to fecundity. Moreover, the cultural import propensity m plays a similar role
to migration. (These observations motivated the notation.)
In this scenario,
r (x; x) =
(1 m)2 + s ( (x)) (1 m2)
n  (n  1) (1 m)2 + s ( (x)) [1 + (n  1)m2] ; (40)
where x = (x; :::; x) 2 Xn, and
 (x) =
(n  1) (1 m)
n  1 +m ; (41)
which leads to
 (x) =   (1 m) [1  s ( (x))]
2n  [m (n  1) + 1] [1  s ( (x))] : (42)
Comparison with the biological scenario with overlapping generations reveals that the coef-
cients of relatedness are the same, but that for any m < 1 the coe¢ cient of tness inter-
dependence is larger under cultural transmission. The enhanced competitiveness is strong
enough to lead to anti-sociality, since  (x) < 0 obtains if and only if (1 m) [1  s ( (x))] <
(2 m [1  s ( (x))])  n, an inequality which holds for all parameter values.28 In this ex-
ample, cultural transmission thus leads to anti-sociality, and anti-sociality is stronger at low
values of m. This is because a low cultural import rate enhances tness interdependence.
Note that although genetic and cultural transmission here lead to opposite predictions re-
garding sociality, one qualitative similarity that appears is that like survival under genetic
transmission, loyalty under cultural transmission has a positive e¤ect on sociality,  (x). We
also note that the negative pro-sociality vanishes as groups tend to become innitely large:
 (x)! 0 as n!1.
To illustrate this, Figure 3 shows that  (x) is strictly negative for all m < 1, for di¤erent
loyalty rates and di¤erent island sizes: for s0 = 0 and n = 2 (the pink curve), s0 = 0:4 and
n = 2 (the orange curve), s0 = 0:8 and n = 2 (the blue curve), s0 = 0 and n = 10 (the pink
dashed curve), s0 = 0:4 and n = 10 (the orange dashed curve), s0 = 0:8 and n = 10 (the
blue dashed curve).
28In evolutionary biology, the same expression as the right hand side of (42) was obtained for the case of
no cultural loyalty as a marginal fecundity cost to benet threshold ratio under which the mutant is favored
in a public good game (eq. 26 of Lehmann, Foster, and Feldman, 2008).
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Figure 3: The value of  (x) as a function of the cultural import rate m, for di¤erent
degrees of background loyalty of o¤spring towards parents.
5 Conclusion
By combining non-cooperative game theory and evolutionary biology, we have derived sev-
eral novel insights on the evolutionary viability of preferences in social interactions. In
particular, our model enables analysis of how the tendency of individuals to interact in fairly
small groups, between which there is limited migration, and between which there may be
conicts, a¤ects such preferences. A key strength of the model is that it makes a distinction
between material payo¤s, which typically is the level at which data analysis by economists
is conducted, and individual tness. Our results clearly show that the qualitative nature
of evolutionarily viable preferences is typically di¤erent at the material payo¤ than at the
individual tness level. Furthermore, our results provide an evolutionary justication for
preferences as drivers of choice, by connecting stability at the strategy level with equilibrium
behavior under certain preferences. Our results thus address a criticism of the literature on
preference evolution, according to which it conates revealed preferences with preferences
that drive choice, see, e.g. Newton (2018).
The cognitive assumption we make is that individuals understand what interaction is at
hand, but they need not know the material payo¤s to others or the preferences of others.
Moreover, our formalization allows for the possibility that in fact there are (nitely) many
interactions going on simultaneously, or that are randomly selected, and even that each in-
teraction involves only a subset of the inhabitants in an island. What is required is symmetry
in the sense that all individuals face the same probabilities of being involved in any one of
the interactions and that the interaction at hand is aggregative and symmetric.
However, if individuals also understand the mapping from strategies to material payo¤s,
a remarkable result emerges from our analysis. Under weak selection the nature of the
derived preferences are independent of the nature of the strategic interaction within islands.
This is because the matching proles then depend only on the population structure, without
any reference to material payo¤s. Hence, the utility function v0 (see (18)) would remain
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uninvadable even if the mapping from material payo¤s to tness and/or the mapping from
strategies to material payo¤s were to change over time, as long as these changes do not
a¤ect the matching probabilities, and as long as individuals understand the mapping from
strategies to material payo¤s and adjust the material payo¤ terms in v0 accordingly.29 Such
robustness, however, presumes that Nash equilibrium play under the adjusted v0 would be
reached. Furthermore, the utility function at the tness level would generally not remain
uninvadable. Given that the aforementioned mappings have certainly changed over the course
of human history, future research should lift the assumption of time-invariant mappings.
While our model is general in the sense that we allow for essentially any type of inter-
actions within groups, it also has several limitations. Perhaps the strongest is that we only
analyze type-homogeneous play and homogeneous populations subject to a single mutant.
More realistic models, with heterogeneous individuals, heterogeneous islands and resident
populations with multiple types are called for. Our hope is that the model proposed here
can be fruitfully used to this end.
6 Appendix
6.1 Fitness and randomness
We here give details about how we justify the expression of individual direct tnessw (i; i; )
in our model. First, we note that, generically in the innite island model, lineage tness of
a mutant trait  in a resident population with trait  is dened as
W (; ) =
n 1X
k=0
pk (; )  w (; ; k) ; (43)
where w (; ; k) is the expected number of settled o¤spring in the next demographic time
period that descend from a given adult mutant with trait  in a group with exactly k other
mutants, and thus n   k   1 individuals with trait . More formally, w : 2  N0 ! R+ is
dened as the expectation of the random number W;;k 2 N0 of settled o¤spring descending
from the given mutant (including herself through survival), conditional on the event that in
the parental demographic time period her island is in state s = (; ; k), that is, with k other
mutants (with trait ) and the other n  k  1 individuals with trait . The stochasticity in
the random variable W;;k is due to within-generation variability.
Let  = (1;2; :::;n;) be the random payo¤ vector on an island, where i is
the random material payo¤ obtained by individual i = 1; :::; n at the end of phase one
of a demographic time period, and  is the random payo¤ earned by a representative
individual in an island where all individuals have trait . According to our decomposition
29To be more specic, and using Scenario A to illustrate this point, if the mappings f and s in (26) change,
while the migration probability m as well as the function w remain unchanged, then the weights attached
to the components in v0 remain unchanged.
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of a demographic time period into two phases (see section 2.1):
w (; ; k) = E [W; j k] = E1 [E2 [W;;k j ] j k] ; (44)
where E1 is the expectation over all stochastic events occurring during phase 1 of the demo-
graphic time period (potential randomness in the actions taken by individuals, and hence
in payo¤s obtained), while E2 is the expectation over all stochastic events occurring dur-
ing phase 2 of the demographic time period (randomness in reproduction, survival, and/or
sampling among competing o¤spring).
We note that three sources of within-generation variability can be distinguished in our
model: (i) within-island trait variability (randomness in the number of other mutants), (ii)
within-island interaction and payo¤ variability (for given number of mutants, randomness
in the payo¤ vector), (iii) within-individual variability (for given number of mutants and
payo¤s, randomness in survival and number of surviving o¤spring). Hence, equation (43)
can be viewed as a three-level iterated expectation:
W (; ) = E0 [E1 [E2 [W;;k j ] j k]] : (45)
This is the grand expectation of the random numberW; of settled o¤spring descending from
a mutant randomly sampled from the local lineage of the initial mutant, sampled during the
random time interval until the rst extinction of the local lineage, a time interval that is
nite with probability one.
We are now in a position to introduce the continuously di¤erentiable individual tness
function w : Rn+1! R that maps realized material payo¤ vectors to the expected number of
o¤spring, conditional to the island state s = (; ; k):
w( ; h ;ik ;) = E2 [W j ; ; ; k] ; (46)
where h ;ik is the random vector of the island neighborspayo¤s, when k neighbors (of
the given mutant) are mutants and the others are residents. We note that in a homogeneous
population, that is, where all individuals carry the same trait, irrespective what that trait
is, and all individuals use the same strategy, the random payo¤s are identically and inde-
pendently distributed, and hence, for  = : w( ; h ;ik ;) = w(~;
D
~; ~
E
; ~) = 1,
due to the constancy of the population in our model. Hence,
w (; ; k) = E1 [w( ; h ;ik ;) j ; ; k] : (47)
6.2 Functions and randomness
So far, we imposed no restrictions on the e¤ect of within-generation uncertainty. A key
assumption we make in the analysis in the main text is that
E1 [w( ; h ;ik ;) j ; ; k] = w ( ( jk) ; h ( jk) ;  (jk)i ;  ()) ; (48)
where  ( jk) = E1 [ j ; ; k],  (jk) = E1 [ j ; ; k],  = E1 [ j ; ; k]. Hence, we
replace the expectation of a function by the function of the expectation for uncertainty in
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phase 1 (type (ii) uncertainty above), which is a substantial assumption, except when all
functions are a¢ ne.
When the game under consideration is but one source for individualstness and there
is variance in payo¤, equation (48) is less restrictive under weak selection than may rst be
thought. To see this, suppose that the total random payo¤ to an individual i (who may
have trait  or ) is the convex combination of two random variables, one exogenous random
background payo¤ (from other interactions, say), b, and the random payo¤ ~i from the
material game under consideration in our model:
i = (1  )b +  ~i (49)
where  2 (0; 1) is small. Then, by way of a Taylor expansion with respect to  at  = 0,
and using the zero-sum property of e¤ects on individualstnesses, we get (with subscripts
on the function w denoting partial derivatives):
w(i; i;) = 1 +   w1(b)  ~i +  
nX
j=2
wj(b)  ~j +   wn+1(b)  ~ +O(2): (50)
Suppose further that the random baseline payo¤b is statistically independent from that
of the specic game, which for an mutant individual i denote ~ . Then
E1 [w(i; i;)] = 1 +   E1 [w1(b)]  E1
h
~i
i
+  
nX
j=2
E1 [wj(b)]  E1
h
~j
i
+   E1 [wn+1 (b)]  E1 [] + O(2); (51)
which leads to the same results as obtained by eq. (68) here below, but with partial derivatives
wj(b) replaced by their expectation.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We show rst that Xu  X^ (P) is a su¢ cient condition for u to be uninvadable. Suppose
that Xu  X^ (P). Then for each ~x 2 Xu, (8) is satised for any strategy y 2 X played by
mutants. In other words, there exists no v 2 F for which some (x; y) 2 BNE (u; v) does not
satisfy the inequality in (10). Hence, the condition (10) for u to be uninvadable in  = F is
satised.
We now show that Xu  X^ (P) is a necessary condition for u is uninvadable. Suppose to
the contrary that u is uninvadable and that there exists some ~x 2 Xu such that ~x =2 X^ (P).
Then there exists some ~y 2 X for which the inequality in (10) is not satised for (~x; ~y).
Consider the mutant utility function v (xi;x i)  kxi   ~yk2; it induces mutants to play the
strategy ~y whichever strategy the residents play. Hence, there exists (x; y) 2 BNE (u; v) for
which (10) is not satised. Since v 2 F , this means that u is invadable in  = F .
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider some uninvadable strategy x^ 2 X^ (P). Then
x^ 2 arg max
y2X
n 1X
k=0
pk (y; x^)  ~w
 
y;y(k); x^(n 1 k); x^

: (52)
Suppose now that ux^ is the resident utility function. To see that x^ is then a resident
strategy, note that given that an individual is opponents in the group play x^, ux^ writes:
ux^;p(xi;x^)
 
xi; x^
(n 1) = n 1X
k=0
pk (xi; x^)  ~w

xi;x
(k)
i ; x^
(n 1 k); x^

; (53)
so that x^ is a resident strategy i¤
x^ 2 arg max
xi2X
n 1X
k=0
pk (xi; x^)  ~w

xi;x
(k)
i ; x^
(n 1 k); x^

; (54)
which is true (to see this, compare this expression to (52)).
However, the fact that x^ is the unique strategy satisfying (52) does not preclude existence
of other resident strategies under ux^. Indeed, consider some strategy ~x. This is a resident
strategy if
~x 2 arg max
xi2X
n 1X
k=0
pk (xi; x^)  ~w

xi;x
(k)
i ; ~x
(n 1 k); x^

: (55)
Lastly, if x^ is the unique resident strategy under ux^, then the set of resident strategies
under ux^ is a subset of X^ (P). This together with Proposition 1 implies that ux^ is uninvadable
in F .
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
For x to be uninvadable it must be that, given x, y = x is a local maximum of
W (y; x) =
n 1X
k=0
pk(y; x) ~w
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x

; (56)
where y(k) is the k-dimensional vector whose components all equal y, and x(n 1 k) is the
(n  1  k)-dimensional vector whose components all equal x, or @W (y;x)
@y

y=x
= 0. To eval-
uate this rst-order condition, we follow the same calculations as in Lehmann, Alger, and
Weibull (2015) Appendix B. In particular, writing ~wj for the partial derivative of ~w with
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respect to its j-th argument,
@W (y; x)
@y
=
n 1X
k=0

@pk(y; x)
@y
~w
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x

+ (57)
n 1X
k=0
"
pk(y; x)
k+1X
j=1
~wj
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x
#
:
Noting that for y = x, ~w
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x

= ~w
 
x;x(n 1); x

= 1, which is independent of
k so that it can be factored out in the rst term, and that
n 1X
k=0
 
@pk(y; x)
@y

y=x
!
=
@
@y
 
n 1X
k=0
pk(y; x)
!
y=x
=
@
@y
(1)

y=x
= 0; (58)
the expression simplies to
@W (y; x)
@y

y=x
=
n 1X
k=0
"
pk(y; x)
k+1X
j=1
~wj
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x
#
y=x
: (59)
Permutation invariance further implies that for any j  2, ~wj
 
x;x(n 1); x

= ~wn
 
x;x(n 1); x

(its as if the individual whose marginal type change is under consideration were systemat-
ically labeled to appear as the last component in the vector x(n 1)). Noticing also thatPn 1
k=0

pk(y; x) ~w1
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x

y=x
= ~w1
 
x;x(n 1); x

, we can write:
@W (y; x)
@y

y=x
= ~w1
 
x;x(n 1); x

+
n 1X
k=1
"
pk(y; x)
k+1X
j=2
~wj
 
y;y(k);x(n 1 k); x
#
y=x
(60)
= ~w1
 
x;x(n 1); x

+
n 1X
k=1

pk(x; x)k ~wn
 
x;x(n 1); x

= ~w1
 
x;x(n 1); x

+ (n  1) ~wn
 
x;x(n 1); x
 n 1X
k=1

kpk(x; x)
(n  1)

= ~w1
 
x;x(n 1); x

+ r(x; x) ~wn
 
x;x(n 1); x

;
which owing to permutation invariance can also be written
@W (y; x)
@y

y=x
= ~w1
 
x;x(n 1); x

+ r(x; x)
nX
j=2
~wj
 
x;x(n 1); x

: (61)
6.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof begins by deriving a lemma under strategy evolution, which is a generalization of
Appendix B of Lehmann, Alger, and Weibull (2015), and will be a stepping stone towards
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the result on preference evolution stated in the proposition. For this purpose, we dene
the lineage payo¤-advantage of a mutant strategy y 2 X in a population of residents using
strategy x 2 X as
 (y; x) =
n 1X
k=0
p0k  ~(k) (y; x) ; (62)
where ~(k) (y; x) is the mutants payo¤ advantage when there are k other mutants in her or
his island, dened by
~(k) (y; x) =  (yjk)  0 

k
n  1 (yjk) +
n  1  k
n  1  (xjk)

: (63)
The rst term in (63) is the payo¤ of a descendant of the initial mutant who nds herself in
an island with k other such descendants. The term in square brackets is the average material
payo¤ earned by the other members in the island.
Lemma 1 A strategy x^ 2 X is uninvadable under weak selection if and only if
(y; x^)  (x^; x^) 8y 2 X: (64)
Moreover, 1  n  0  1.
Proof of Lemma 1: Let w : Rn+1 ! R be any continuously di¤erentiable tness
function, let b 2 R, and let b denote the vector in Rn+1 that has all components equal to b.
Then, by virtue of (86),
w1 (b) +
nX
j=2
wj (b) + wn+1 (b) = 0; (65)
where an index k = 1; :::; n+ 1 stands for the partial derivative of w with respect to its k-th
argument.
Recalling the denition of  (see (16)), and omitting for notational simplicity the term
(1  ) 0, for any given payo¤ vector (i; i; ) 2 Rn+1 a rst-order Taylor expansion of
w with respect to  evaluated at 0 writes
w (i;  i; ) = w (0i; 0 i; 0) + (   0)  w1 (0i; 0 i; 0)  i (66)
+ (   0) 
nX
j=2
[wj (0i; 0 i; 0)  j]
+ (   0)  wn+1 (0i; 0 i; 0)   +O(2):
Evaluated at 0 = 0, this expression writes
w (i;  i; ) = w (0)+ w1 (0) i+ 
nX
j=2
wj (0) j+ wn+1 (0) +O(2); (67)
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where w (0) = 1, and 0 is the vector in Rn+1 whose components all equal 0. By permu-
tation invariance of w (i; i; ) with respect to the components of  i, we may for each
j = 2; :::; n write wn (0) instead of wj (0). Letting  = w1 (0) and  =   (n  1)wn (0),
using (65), and rearranging terms, (67) can thus be written
w (i;  i; ) = 1 +  
"
  (i   )  
n  1
X
j 6=i
(j   )
#
+O(2): (68)
Letting
0 =


=  (n  1)wn (0)
w1 (0)
; (69)
and factoring out  > 0 from (68), and simply omitting to write the factor  in the tness
function, we conclude that for small  > 0,
w (i;  i; ) = 1 +   
"
i   0
X
j 6=i
j
n  1   (1  0)

#
+O(2): (70)
This shows that 0 quanties tness interdependence among patch members (Lehmann, Al-
ger, and Weibull, 2015; see also Frank, 1998, and Gardner and West, 2004, for a description,
but without a formal derivation, of 0).
The next step of the proof consists in obtaining an expression for local linage tness
under weak selection. Under weak selection the evolutionary process is what in biology is
called neutral (Crow and Kimura, 1970, Ewens, 2004, Gillespie, 2004, and, for an explicit
example, Rousset, 2004). Formally, this means that we can write
pk(y; x^) = p
0
k +O() 8k; (71)
where O() accounts for the deviation (relative to the neutral process) of the strategy-prole
distribution induced by selection (i.e.,  > 0) that is at most of order , where p0k is strategy-
independent. Second, recalling the denition of ~w (see (7)) and letting x^ denote the resident
strategy, (70) can be written
~w
 
y;
 
y(k); x^

; x^

= 1 +   ~(k) (y; x^)  (1  0)(x^)+O(2); (72)
where
 
y(k); x^

is the (n  1)-dimensional vector with k components equal to y and the
remaining components equal to x^, and (see equation (63))
~(k) (y; x^) =  (yjk)  0

k
n  1 (yjk) +
n  1  k
n  1  (x^jk)

: (73)
Using (71) and (72), local lineage tness (see (2)) writes
W (y; x^) =
n 1X
k=0
pk(y; x^)  ~w
 
y;
 
y(k); x^

(74)
= 1 +  
n 1X
k=0
p0k 

~(k) (y; x^)  (1  0)(x^)

+O(2):
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Recalling the denition of lineage payo¤-advantage (y; x^) (see (62)),this can be written as
W (y; x^) = 1 +   [ (y; x^)  (1  0)(x^)] +O(2): (75)
Neglecting higher order terms in  in this equation, the condition for uninvadability [W (y; x^) 
W (x^; x^) for all y 2 X] under weak selection is equivalent to the condition (y; x^)  (x^; x^)
for all y 2 X.
Finally, we determine the implications of Assumption [M] for the bounds on 0 =
  (n  1)  wn (0) =w1 (0), focusing on the non-trivial case wn (0) 6= 0. Part (ii) of the
assumption implies   (n  1)  0. Moreover, recalling (65) we obtain 0  1, with strict
inequality when either wn+1 (0) < 0 or wn+1 (0) = 0 and n > 2. Q.E.D.
We are now in a position to complete the proof of the proposition. To establish the rst
claim of the proposition, we note that Lemma 1 implies that Xv0 = X^. The second claim
follows by noting that any utility function u 2 F for which some x 2 Xu is not an element
of Xv0 , is invadable.
6.7 Approximation of the neutral distribution
Standard populations genetics results (see e.g., Lessard, 2007, and references therein) show
that the neutral distribution of types in an island model with constant group size, and with
population share of mutants " > 0, is well approximated by way of the hypergeometric
distribution
j(") =

j + !"  1
j

n  j + !(1  ")  1
n  j

=

n+ !   1
n

; (76)
where j(") is the probability that there are j = 0; 1; ::; n mutants in any given group, and
! = r0=(1   r0) (see Lessard, 2007, equation (7)). Since p0 =
 
p00; :::; p
0
n 1

is the limit
distribution when "! 0 of the number of other mutants in a given mutants group, we have
p0k = lim
"!0
(k + 1)k+1(")=
 
nX
j=1
jj(")
!
; (77)
for k = 0; 1; :::; n  1. Upon rearrangements, this produces
p0k =

n
k + 1

 (k + 1)!
n
  (k + 1) (! + n  k   1)
 (! + n)
; (78)
where   is the gamma function. This distribution depends only on group size n and pairwise
relatedness r0.
Numerical comparison between this approximation for the above evolutionary scenarios
(that can all be subsumed under the relatedness in (40)) and the exact distribution shows
that the average total variation between the approximate and exact distributions is quite
small. Sampling randomly 10 000 values of s and m when n = 5 gives an average total
variation of 0:005, a variation that should diminish with n. It can also be shown that in the
special case of a Moran process (s (i) = 1=n) the approximation is in fact exact. (Indeed it
can be veried that the expression in (78) then reduces to equation D.6 in Lehmann, Alger,
and Weibull, 2015.)
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6.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Recalling that
~w(xi;x i; x) = w

 (xi;x i) ; ( (xj;x j))j 6=i ; 
 (x)

; (79)
we obtain
~w1
 
x;
 
y(0);x

; x

= w1


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

 1
 
x;
 
y(0);x

(80)
+ (n  1)  wn


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

 n
 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
where
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
denotes the (n  1)-dimensional vector whose components all
equal 
 
x;
 
y(0);x

, and
~wn
 
x;
 
y(0);x

; x

= w1


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

 n
 
x;
 
y(0);x

(81)
+ (n  2)  wn


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

 n
 
x;
 
y(0);x

+ wn


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

 1
 
x;
 
y(0);x

:
Substituting the last two equations into the last line of (60) produces
0 = w1


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

 1
 
x;
 
y(0);x

(82)
+ (n  1)  wn


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

 n
 
x;
 
y(0);x

+ r (x; x) (n  1)w1


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

 n
 
x;
 
y(0);x

+ r (x; x) (n  1) (n  2)  wn


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

 n
 
x;
 
y(0);x

+ r (x; x) (n  1)wn


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

 1
 
x;
 
y(0);x

:
Noting that with the notation used in this proof,  (x) writes
 (x) =  
(n  1)wn


 
x;
 
y(0);x

;
 

 
x;
 
y(0);x
(n 1)
;  (x)

w1

 (x; (y(0);x)) ; ( (x; (y(0);x)))
(n 1)
;  (x)
 ; (83)
(82) can be written
1
 
x;
 
y(0);x

+ (n  1)  r (x; x)   (x)

1
n 1 + r (x; x)
n 2
n 1

1   (x) r (x; x)  n
 
x;
 
y(0);x

= 0; (84)
or
[1   (x)]  1
 
x;
 
y(0);x

+  (x) 
nP
k=1
k
 
x;
 
y(0);x

= 0: (85)
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6.9 Proof of Proposition 6
To show that  (x) 2 [ 1; 1], we begin by studying  (x). Note that the terms that dene
 (x) are partial derivatives evaluated in a homogenous population. Furthermore, since
population size is constant in a homogenous population, each individuals tness would
remain at 1 following a marginal change in the material payo¤ of all the individuals in the
population. Formally:
@w (i; i; )
@i

i=j=
+
Xn
j=2
@w (i; i; )
@j

i=j=
+
@w (i; i; )
@

i=j=
= 0:
(86)
By permutation invariance, and using a more compact notation, this writesw1 ()+(n  1)wn ()+
wn+1 () = 0. Using this and the assumption w1 () > 0,
 (x) < 1,   (n  1)wn () < w1 () (87)
, w1 () + w () < w1 () ;
which is true by Assumption [M] (iii).
Since r (x; x) 2 [0; 1] for all x this implies that  (x) r (x; x) < 1, and hence
 (x)  1, r (x; x)   (x)

1
n  1 + r (x; x)
n  2
n  1

 1   (x) r (x; x) (88)
,  (x)

r (x; x)  1
n  1   r (x; x)
n  2
n  1

 1  r (x; x)
,  (x)

r (x; x)  1
n  1

 1  r (x; x)
,  (x)    (n  1)
,  (n  1)wn ()
w1 ()    (n  1)
, wn ()  w1 () ;
which is true by virtue of Assumption [M] (ii).
We now show that  (x)   1. For any  (x) < 1,  (x) is increasing in r (x; x). Indeed,
the partial derivative of the expression for  (x) with respect to r (x; x) has the same sign as
(in this expression r  r (x; x) and    (x))
[(n  1) (1  ) + ] (n  1) (1  r) +  (n  1) [r (n  1) (1  )   (1  r)] (89)
= (n  1) (1  ) (n  1 + ) :
For the inequality  (x)   1 to hold, it is thus su¢ cient that  (x)   1 for r (x; x) = 0, a
condition which reduces to
  (x)    (n  1) ; (90)
which is true for any n  2 since  (x) < 1.
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Finally,
 (x)  r (x; x), r (x; x)   (x)

1
n 1 + r (x; x)
n 2
n 1

1   (x) r (x; x)  r (x; x) (91)
, r (x; x)   (x)

1
n  1 + r (x; x)
n  2
n  1

 r (x; x) [1   (x) r (x; x)]
,  (x) [r (x; x)]2   (x)

1
n  1 + r (x; x)
n  2
n  1

,  (x) r (x; x) [1  [1  r (x; x)] (n  1)]   (x) :
This inequality is true if and only if  (x)  0 by virtue of the fact that for all r (x; x) 2 [0; 1)
we have r (x; x) [1  [1  r (x; x)] (n  1)]  1. Likewise, it is clear that  (x) > r (x; x) if
and only if  (x) < 0.
Finally, the last result stated in the proposition is implied by (20) together with Assump-
tion [M] (i).
6.10 Calculating the coe¢ cients of tness interdependence and
pairwise relatedness
6.10.1 Scenario A: Genes
To calculate  (x) we begin by calculating the partial derivatives needed for this purpose.
Here, from the individual tness function (26):
@w (i; i; )
@j
=  @s (j)
@j
 (1 m) f (i)
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf () (92)
 
 
n 
nX
j=1
s (j)
!
 (1 m)
2 f (i) [@f (j) =@j]h
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf ()i2
and
@w (i; i; )
@i
=
@s (i)
@i
  @s (i)
@i
 (1 m) f (i)
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf () (93)
+
 
n 
nX
j=1
s (j)
!
 (1 m) [@f (i) =@i]
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf ()
 
 
n 
nX
j=1
s (j)
!
 (1 m)
2 f (i) [@f (j) =@j]h
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf ()i2
+ [1  s ()]  m [@f (i) =@i]
f ()
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Writing s0 () for @s(j)
@j

j=
and f 0 () for @f(j)
@j

j=
, we obtain (upon simplication)
@w (i; i; )
@j

i=j=
=  s0 ()  1 m
n
  [1  s ()]  (1 m)
2 f 0 ()
nf ()
(94)
and
@w (i; i; )
@i

i=j=
=
1
n
(n+m  1) s0 () + [1  s ()] f
0 ()
nf ()

n  (1 m)2 :
(95)
Upon simplication, we thus obtain
 (x) =
(n  1) (1 m)
n
(1 m) [1  s ()] f 0()
f() + s
0 ()
o

n  (1 m)2 [1  s ()] f 0()
f() + (n+m  1) s0 ()
: (96)
The expression in (28) obtains by setting s0 () = 0.
To calculate r (x; x), one uses a recursion equation (this is a standard technique for
calculating probabilities of identity by descent; see Nagylaki, 1992, and Rousset, 2004, for a
background). In the scenario at hand, this equation writes
r (x; x) = [s ()]2 r (x; x) + 2s () [1  s ()] (1 m)

1
n
+
n  1
n
r (x; x)

(97)
+ [1  s ()]2 (1 m)2

1
n
+
n  1
n
r (x; x)

:
The left-hand side is the average probability that, in a monomorphic population in which
all individuals play x, the neighbor of a randomly drawn member of a certain local lineage
is also a member of this local lineage. The terms on the right-hand side details the events
in which this happens. The rst term on the right hand side corresponds to the event that
both the individual at hand and the randomly drawn neighbor survived from the previous
period. The second term on the right hand side corresponds to the two events in which
either the individual at hand or the randomly drawn neighbor survived from the previous
period while the other didnt, and the one who didnt survive from the previous period did
not migrate in from another island. In this case, there is a probability 1=n that one is the
o¤spring of the other, in which case they are both members of the same local lineage with
certainty; with the complementary probability, they are not parent and child, in which case
the probability that they are both members of the same local lineage equals r (x; x). The
third term on the right hand side corresponds to the event in which neither the individual
at hand nor the randomly drawn neighbor survived from the previous period, and neither
of them migrated in from another island. In this case, there is a probability 1=n that they
have the same parent, in which case they are both members of the same local lineage with
certainty; with the complementary probability, they have di¤erent parents, in which case
the probability that they are both members of the same local lineage equals r (x; x). Solving
(97) for r (x; x) yields
r (x; x) =
(1 m)2 + (1 m2) s ()
n  (n  1) (1 m)2 + [1 + (n  1)m2] s () : (98)
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The expression in (27) obtains by replacing s () by s0.
6.10.2 Scenario B: Guns
In the biological scenario with wars, we obtain from the individual tness function (30):
@w (i; i; )
@j
= 2 [@g (; ) =@j] 

m  f (i)
f ()
+ (99)
(1 m)n  f (i)
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf ()
#
  [(1  ) + 2g (; )]  (1 m)n  (1 m) f (i) [@f (j) =@j]h
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf ()i2
and
@w (i; i; )
@i
= 2 [@g (; ) =@i] 

m  f (i)
f ()
+ (100)
(1 m)n  f (i)
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf ()
#
+ [(1  ) + 2g (; )]  (1 m)n

h
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf ()i @f (i) =@i   (1 m) f (i) [@f (j) =@j]h
(1 m)Pnj=1 f (j) + nmf ()i2
+m
@f (i) =@i
f ()
: (101)
By permutation invariance of g, write gn (; ) for
@g(;)
@j

j=
for all j = 1; :::; n. Since,
moreover, g (; ) = 1=2, upon simplication we obtain:
@w (i; i; )
@j

i=j=
= 2gn (
; )  (1 m)
2 f 0 ()
nf ()
(102)
and
@w (i; i; )
@i

i=j=
= 2gn (
; )  (1 m)
2 f 0 ()
nf ()
+
f 0 ()
f ()
; (103)
so that
 (x) =  
(n  1)
h
2gn (
; )  (1 m)2f 0()
nf()
i
2gn (; ) + [n  (1 m)2] f 0()nf()
: (104)
The recursion equation to calculate r (x; x) writes
r (x; x) = (1 m)2

1
n
+
n  1
n
r (x; x)

: (105)
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In this scenario, the only event in which a randomly drawn individual can belong to the
same local lineage as a randomly drawn neighbor, is when both stayed in their natal island.
In this case, there is a probability 1=n that they have the same parent, in which case they
belong to the same local lineage with certainty; with the complementary probability, they
have di¤erent parents, in which case the probability that they belong to the same local
lineage is r (x; x). Solving for r (x; x) yields
r (x; x) =
(1 m)2
n  (n  1) (1 m)2 : (106)
6.10.3 Scenario B: Wars (weak selection)
Recall that under weak selection we write the individual tness of individual i asw (i;  i; ),
where (i;  i; ) = ((1  ) 0 + i; (1  )0 +  i; (1  )0 + ) (here 0 is the
(n  1)-dimensional vector whose components all equal 0) and   0 represents the inten-
sity of selection (see (16)). From (69) in the proof of Proposition 5, we have
0 =  
X
j 6=i
@w (i;  i; ) =@jj=0
@w (i;  i; ) =@ij=0
: (107)
Since, for  = 0, i = j = , we obtain from (102) and (103) that
@w (i;  i; )
@j

=0
= 2gn (
; )  (1 m)
2 f 0 ()
nf ()
(108)
and
@w (i;  i; )
@i

=0
= 2gn (
; )  (1 m)
2 f 0 ()
nf ()
+
f 0 ()
f ()
: (109)
With the expressions for f and g given in (33) and (34), and the assumption that V (i;  i) =
(1  )n0+

i +
P
j 6=i j

(note that we assume that the intensity of selection is the same
for fecundity and for the probability of winning wars; one can also allow for di¤erent selection
intensities), we have:
f 0 ()
f ()
= 1 (110)
and
gn (
; ) =
1
4
: (111)
Hence, we get
0 =  
(n  1)
h
=2  (1 m)2
n
i
=2  (1 m)2
n
+ 1
; (112)
which upon simplication gives the expression in (35). It can then be veried that, together
with the fact that r0 is given by (106), this gives the expression for 0 in (36).
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6.10.4 Scenario C: Culture
In the cultural scenario, we have from (38):
@w (i; i; )
@j
=  @s (j)
@j
 (1 m) f (i)Pn
j=1 f (j)
(113)
 
 
n 
nX
j=1
s (j)
!
 (1 m) f (i) [@f (j) =@j]hPn
j=1 f (j)
i2
and
@w (i; i; )
@i
=
@s (i)
@i
  @s (i)
@i
 (1 m) f (i)Pn
j=1 f (j)
(114)
+ (1 m)
 
n 
nX
j=1
s (j)
!

[@f (i) =@i]
hP
j 6=i f (j)
i
hPn
j=1 f (j)
i2
+ [1  s ()]  m [@f (i) =@i]
f ()
:
Upon simplication, we obtain:
@w (i; i; )
@j

i=j=
=  (1 m)
n

s0 () + [1  s ()]  f
0 ()
f ()

(115)
and
@w (i; i; )
@i

i=j=
=

n  1 +m
n

s0 () + [1  s ()]  f
0 ()
f ()

: (116)
Hence:
 (x) =
(n  1) (1 m)
n  1 +m : (117)
For r (x; x) the recursion equation writes
r (x; x) = [s ()]2 r (x; x) + 2 (1 m) s () [1  s ()]

1
n
+
n  1
n
r (x; x)

(118)
+ (1 m)2 [1  s ()]2 

1
n
+
n  1
n
r (x; x)

:
The rst term on the right-hand side corresponds to the event that both the individual at
hand and the randomly drawn neighbor have been loyal to their parents, where the neighbors
parent belongs to the individuals lineage with probability r (x; x). The second term on the
right hand side corresponds to the event that either the individual at hand was loyal to its
parent but the randomly drawn neighbor was not loyal to its parent, or the other way around.
In this case, there is a probability 1=n that the non-loyal child acquired its trait from the
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loyal childs parent, in which case they both belong to the same local lineage with certainty,
while with the complementary probability this did not happen, in which case the probability
that the randomly neighbor belongs to the same local lineage is r (x; x). The third term
on the right hand side corresponds to the event that neither the individual at hand nor
the randomly drawn neighbor were loyal to their parents but both of them acquired their
trait from someone in the island. In this case, there is a probability 1=n that they acquired
their type from the same adult, in which case they belong to the same local lineage with
certainty; with the complementary probability they have di¤erent cultural parents, in which
case the probability that the randomly drawn neighbor belongs to the same local lineage as
the individual at hand is r (x; x). We note that the equation simplies to
r (x; x) = [s ()]2 r (x; x) + 2s () [1  s ()] (1 m)

1
n
+
n  1
n
r (x; x)

(119)
+ [1  s ()]2 (1 m)2

1
n
+
n  1
n
r (x; x)

:
The expression in the text obtains upon observing that this equation is identical to the one
in (97).
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